Brian Griffiths: Was Margaret Thatcher’s Monetarism Necessary?

This article on Thatcher’s Monetarism and Timothy Lankester’s ‘Inside Thatcher’s Monetarism Experiment’ originally appeared at TheArticle

Sir Timothy Lankester has had a distinguished career of public service. He has served as Permanent Secretary at the Overseas Development Administration and the Department of Education; Director of the School of Oriental and African Studies; President of Corpus Christi College, Oxford; and Chairman of the Council, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. Inside Thatcher’s Monetarism Experiment (Policy Press, University of Bristol, 240 pp, £19.99) is about his time seconded as a member of the Administrative (not Government) Civil Service from H.M. Treasury to 10 Downing Street to serve as the Prime Minister’s Secretary for Economic Affairs, initially for James Callaghan (7 months) and then Margaret Thatcher (two and a half years).

The purpose of the book is to fill a gap in the economic history of the late 1970s and early 1980s and to show how Mrs Thatcher became infatuated with monetarism as an economic doctrine and implemented it as a laboratory experiment. However, this involved a vast cost of nearly one and a half million people becoming unemployed and thousands of firms going out of business. The author writes as a “disbelieving monetarist”: namely, someone who went along with monetarism because markets believed in it, even though he personally, in the best traditions of the UK Civil Service, did not.

While I am critical of Lankester’s understanding and assessment of monetarism, I thoroughly enjoyed reading the book. Its highlights are his relationship with the Prime Minister and colleagues, as well as his comments on the role and views of politicians, civil servants, special advisers, Bank of England officials, journalists, academic commentators and others.

He writes with admiration and affection for Mrs Thatcher, even though his view of the role and potential of government and the failures and imperfections of markets was very different from hers. “Mrs Thatcher and I got on well from day one,” is the way he describes his working relationship with the Prime Minister. He found her a kind and generous boss, including being invited regularly to the study for a drink in the early evening or supper in the flat with Dennis. He admired her in many ways, not least because, as he puts it, “she greatly valued those of us who worked most closely with her … there was a strong chemistry between us … the closeness of our relationship surprised me then and it surprises me to this day.” Yet he recognises that she had “a schizophrenic attitude to the Civil Service”, largely because of its ineffective delivery of services and its failure to get to grips with an increasingly bloated public sector.

The author makes clear that he approaches the subject with some personal history: he grew up in the lengthened shadow of the Great Depression, because his grandfather, a medical doctor, was forced to close his medical practice in 1930, leaving his father with no money to finish his schooling or attend university. In the Thatcher years, his wife’s family-run cotton textile manufacturing business in West Yorkshire was also forced to close.

This personal background and the great increase in unemployment from 1979 onwards leads him to a positively Augustinian confession:  “Although only a minor player in this sad saga, I have always found it difficult to come to terms with the part I both wittingly and unwittingly played in it.  … with hindsight, my admiration for her at a personal level, and my wish for her to succeed, made me work almost too hard on her behalf … I put to one side my reservations about monetarism and made myself see the world through her monetarist lens … I might have done more to push back on what Lawson would later call her ‘primitivist monetarism’ … this book is, in part, my attempt to achieve some kind of personal resolution.

One issue which he addresses inadequately is why Mrs Thatcher, as someone proud of her training as a scientist, became so committed to the importance of monetary policy in controlling inflation. Her conviction was far from some beatific vision: it took the best part of a decade to develop.

When Mrs Thatcher became Prime Minister in May 1979, she inherited an economy described at the time as “the sick man of Europe” and suffering from “the British disease”: low productivity, high inflation, rising unemployment, stagflation, militant trade unions, strikes, and so on. The real pre-tax rate of return on trading assets in the UK manufacturing sector, which averaged around 10% in the 1960s, fell to 2.7% in 1974 and 1.9% in 1975; in textiles and metal manufacture, the real return was negative. Between 1974 and 1979, inflation averaged 16% annually, productivity was stagnant and the Government found it easier to borrow through the nationalised industries than on the Government’s own credit. The conventional Keynesian orthodoxy in terms of policy-making was also proving equally bankrupt: the long-run trade-off between unemployment and inflation had broken down; extra public spending or lower taxes could not be relied on to create more jobs; and a succession of incomes policies, voluntary and statutory, had proved ineffective in controlling inflation under previous Conservative and Labour governments.

After sitting around Edward Heath’s Cabinet table for four years, Mrs Thatcher had become convinced that if inflation was to be brought down, it needed some overall financial discipline. Subsequently, in 1976, while she was Leader of the Opposition, the IMF granted a loan to the UK (when it was effectively bust), but did so only on the condition that the Government would place ceilings on public sector borrowing and money supply growth (in the form of domestic credit expansion). In the academic world, distinguished scholars such as Hayek, Friedman, Johnson, Brunner, Walters and others had conducted extensive research which established that money supply growth affected prices in the long term, but in the short term, mainly output and employment. In addition, the explanation put forward by the Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank to account for the success of their policies in controlling inflation was their control of money supply growth in their respective countries. All of this was in marked contrast to the part that money played in the intellectual approach of the UK Treasury, Bank of England and distinguished members of the then highly influential Cambridge University economics department.

The author deserves credit for recognising some of this, but then concludes with two observations: first, that the assumptions according to which monetarism should work were incorrect; and, second, that the cost of implementing the policy in increased unemployment was unacceptably high. 

Lankester is certainly right to point out that the optimism of some of the early monetarists, myself included, was unfounded. Over the short term there was no systematic relationship between money supply growth and prices – the time lag was two years or longer. There were also differences of outcome when using different measures of the money supply. In addition, the regulatory environment in which monetary policy was conducted was constantly changing. Innovations such as the introduction of Competition and Credit Control, regulation by the “corset” and the abolition of exchange controls, made time series analysis difficult. However, the demand for money (the inverse of the velocity of circulation) has turned out to be stable over the longer term, such that central banks are able to control a measure of broad money which will affect prices after two year time lag. The best advice for a central bank is to aim for a steady growth of the money stock which is in line with the trend growth of money income.

The additional objection the author has to monetarism is its enormous cost in human suffering: namely, over 1 million jobs made redundant.

When she became Prime Minister in 1979, Mrs Thatcher made a point of honouring the pay settlements carried over from the “Winter of Discontent”, as well as the public sector pay awards recommended by the Clegg Commission, which the previous Government had instituted. Both were factors which inevitably led to some increase in unemployment, as was the new policy of switching revenues from high rates of income tax to a higher rate of VAT. However, over the next six years, unemployment in the UK continued to rise: from 6% to 12% of the labour force.

What is equally remarkable is that between 1980 and 1985 unemployment increased on average in all European Economic Community (EEC) countries — and by a large amount, from 5.8% to 11.2%. In Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands it rose above 12%. Even in Germany the unemployment rate more than doubled from 3.4% to 8.4%. Among the causes of this increase were the quadrupling of the oil price following the Iranian revolution and “sticky” real wages, because trade union bargaining power was strong, especially in public sector industries. But research has shown that fiscal tightening was not the cause. In other words, even without Mrs Thatcher’s policy revolution, executed by her Chancellor of the Exchequer Geoffrey Howe, unemployment would have risen significantly, if not doubled.

Lankester also acknowledges that research by Stephen Nickell and Jan van Ours had estimated that the “natural” rate of unemployment over these years for the UK — that is, the level at which the rate of inflation would remain stable, whether it was 0%, 2% or 10% — had risen from 3.8% (1969-73) to 7.5% (1974-89) and then to 9.5% (1981-86).

He concludes by recognising that there are positives from the growth of monetarism: that money does matter, in both analysis and policy, although we are not told how exactly that is so; that there is a “natural” rate of unemployment and so no sustainable trade-off between unemployment and inflation; that monetary policy is to be preferred to fiscal policy in the management of aggregate demand; and that unacceptable levels of unemployment must be tackled through micro-economic not macro-economic policies.

Should Mrs Thatcher have introduced an incomes policy which might have restrained wage increases over these years? Incomes policy had been introduced on numerous occasions since the early 1960s. The evidence from all incomes policies — whether introduced by Labour or Conservative governments and regardless of whether they were voluntary or statutory — is that they had no lasting impact on inflation. While they did initially lead to some wage restraint, this was subsequently undone, usually accompanied by strikes and industrial unrest.

Could the “British disease” of high inflation and high unemployment have been remedied without shock treatment? In principle, of course, it could — but in practice I very much doubt it. The most difficult challenge for the Thatcher Government in 1979-81 was to confront the economic malaise and the entrenched expectations of future inflation by trade unions, companies and the general public. This required a belief that the Government had a clear policy, that it would stick to the policy even though unemployment was rising, and that it would not change course. This it did. Its anti-inflationary policy was strengthened later by trade union reforms which reduced their power to disrupt the economy.

The irony of all this is that the 1981 Budget, which was roundly condemned by 364 economists because it put up taxes in order to reduce public borrowing (which was already greater than planned), actually marked the moment from which the UK economy recovered. It was a recovery that endured for the rest of the decade.

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Brian Griffiths (Lord Griffiths of Fforestfach) is a Senior Research Fellow at Centre for Enterprise, Markets and Ethics (CEME) and Founding Chair of CEME (serving as Chair until 2023). Among other things he served at No. 10 Downing Street as head of the Prime Minister’s Policy Unit from 1985 to 1990 and Chair of the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) from 1991 to 2001.

 

Photograph at top: Valentin Poleac; reproduced from Wikimedia Commons in accordance with a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International licence.