

THE CENTRE FOR ENTERPRISE, MARKETS AND ETHICS

ENTERPRISE AND VALUES SERIES

# THE CHALLENGES OF MIGRATION

ANDREI ROGOBETE

Copyright © 2018, Andrei Rogobete

Copyright © 2018: this edition, The Centre for Enterprise, Markets and  
Ethics

The moral rights of the author have been asserted.

All rights reserved. This book or any portion thereof may not be reproduced or used in any manner whatsoever without the express written permission of the publisher except for the use of brief quotations in a book review.

Scripture quotations are from New Revised Standard Version Bible: Anglicized Edition, copyright © 1989, 1995 National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America. Used by permission. All rights reserved.

First Edition, 2018

ISBN: 978-1-910666-12-8

Published by:  
Centre for Enterprise, Markets and Ethics  
31 Beaumont Street  
Oxford OX1 2NP

Design by Push Start Marketing Ltd, 46 Market Square, Witney,  
Oxfordshire OX28 6AL

Printed in the United Kingdom by Foremost Print Ltd, Unit 9a, Vantage  
Business Park, Bloxham Road, Banbury, Oxfordshire OX16 9UX

## THE CENTRE FOR ENTERPRISE, MARKETS AND ETHICS

We are a think tank based in Oxford that seeks to promote an enterprise, market economy built on ethical foundations.

We undertake research on the interface of Christian theology, economics and business.

Our aim is to argue the case for an economy that generates wealth, employment, innovation and enterprise within a framework of calling, integrity, values and ethical behaviour, leading to the transformation of the business enterprise and contributing to the relief of poverty.

We publish a range of material, hold events and conferences, undertake research projects and speak and teach in the areas with which we are concerned.

We are independent and a registered charity entirely dependent on donations for our work.

Our website is [www.theceme.org](http://www.theceme.org).

For further information please contact the Director, Richard Turnbull, at:

The Centre for Enterprise, Markets and Ethics  
First Floor, 31 Beaumont Street,  
Oxford OX1 2NP

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Andrei Rogobete is Research Fellow with the Centre for Enterprise, Markets and Ethics. His main areas of research include ethical business models, globalisation and sustainable governance.

His background is in political consulting and media relations, having previously worked in Westminster for Media Intelligence Partners (MIP). During his time at MIP, Andrei worked on bespoke political campaigns for several high-profile politicians and members of the Cabinet.

Andrei is currently pursuing theological studies at the University of Oxford. He also holds an MSc from University College London in Business and a BA in Politics and International Relations from Royal Holloway, University of London.

# CONTENTS

Introduction	7
1 Post-war Britain and Cultural Integration	13
2 Britain and the Development of the European Union	25
3 The Economics of Migration	43
4 Christianity, the Church and Migration	65
5 Conclusions	77



# INTRODUCTION

International migration is set to become one of the defining global issues of the twenty-first century:

- Over one million migrants from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and other Middle Eastern and North African countries reached European shores in 2015 alone,<sup>1</sup> most of them refugees fleeing conflict in their home countries, others attracted by the lure of a more prosperous future on the European continent.
- The US Department for Homeland Security estimates that there are over 11 million illegal immigrants currently living in the USA, the majority of whom are from Mexico and South America.<sup>2</sup> Donald Trump promised early on in his electoral campaign that he would build a great wall between Mexico and the USA and make 'Mexico pay for it'.<sup>3</sup> Radical as it may sound, it proved to be one of the defining statements that earned him the presidential nomination of one of America's two main political parties and, subsequently, the Presidency itself.
- On 23 June 2016 the United Kingdom voted in a national referendum to leave the European Union (EU), the 'Leave' side winning 51.8% of the vote. Some consider European immigration and, more specifically, the EU's 'free movement of people' to be a key contributing factor to the 'Brexit' result.<sup>4</sup> There is data suggesting that one-third of voters backed Brexit because they believed it 'offered the best chance for the UK to regain control over immigration and its own borders'.<sup>5</sup>

These are just a few recent examples that drive the topic of international migration to becoming one of the defining issues of our time. The Independent Commission on Multilateralism (ICM) believes that issues of global migration now 'top the foreign policy agenda of leading nations'.<sup>6</sup>



How should the nation state and the international community as a whole respond to this vastly complex issue? What are the political, economic, social and religious implications?

This publication seeks to narrow down the debate and focus specifically on immigration to the UK, within the context of the European Union as well as globally. While not engaging in primary research, it aims to conduct an intra-disciplinary synthesis of the work that has already been made available to the public.

There is no doubt that a plethora of research on the topic of UK immigration has been produced over the last decade. However, the analysis and research produced has often been in isolation: too much academic work remains within academic circles, too many economists only debate their ideas with other economists, and the Church often responds in a limited fashion. Even think tanks, more often than not, are confined by their own political agendas.

As a result, politicians and policy-makers are left with highly topical information that fails to give the whole picture – not to mention the day-to-day, immediate political pressures that invariably force many in public office to rely more on their political gut feeling than specialised political or economic studies. The problem is that too many studies discuss economic predictions but omit the political and social implications. This leads to weak and in some cases inadequate policy development. Moral and religious argument is often conducted in isolation.

Undoubtedly, discussion on immigration can rapidly become a perilous road. More than any other topic of public concern, the debate around immigration strikes a powerful emotional chord. It often forces participants to re-evaluate their own identity, their loyalties and, most importantly, to test their willingness to accept the foreigner, the ‘other’. Immigration strikes at the core of public life. It both influences and moulds the very fabric of society.

Therefore there is a great need for intra-disciplinary work – and not just targeted at policy-makers or politicians, but for the general public as a whole. It is vital that a society as well developed as that of the UK has an overall view of the benefits and consequences of migration to and from the country.

This publication will be a first step in that direction. It will attempt to bring together the economic, social, political and religious implications of migration<sup>7</sup> to the UK. It will also explore some of the lessons that can be learnt from the past and what a sensible approach to managing migration for the future may look like.

Chapter 1 will begin by presenting a historical account of migration to the UK from 1945 to the present day. Here the main focus will be on the dynamics between international pressures and events, and the political responses of the British government at the time. The analysis will also consider the social and cultural implications of migration, and will look at the failure of multiculturalism in the UK and why there is need for greater social cohesion and integration.

Chapter 2 will consider Britain's legislative history on immigration and its relationship with the European Union. It will seek to understand how Britain moved from an open-door policy with the Commonwealth that ended with the seminal Immigration Act 1971, to membership of the European Communities (now the European Union) in the 1975 referendum.

### **‘Immigration strikes a powerful emotional chord’**

Without going into too much detail, this chapter will also look at the development of the EU and its four ‘fundamental freedoms’ – particularly in light of globalisation and neoclassical economic thought.

Chapter 3 will focus on the economics of net immigration to the UK. It will seek to discover the main financial benefits and costs that immigration has on the British economy within a globalisation framework. With the aim of building a less ‘biased’ approach, economic studies from across the political spectrum will be considered. More importantly, an attempt will be made to distinguish between pure ‘political’ rhetoric and the hard facts. Placed within a framework of globalisation theory, the chapter will ultimately seek to answer questions such as:

- For what purposes do migrants come to the UK?
- What impact does the scale of net immigration have on the UK economy?
- Does immigration have an impact on UK wages/employment/housing? If so, how?
- What are the demographics of the migrants themselves (age, nationality etc.)?
- What sort of qualifications do migrants hold on arrival in the UK?
- How well are migrants economically integrating in British society?

Chapter 4 will look at the Church's response to the issue of immigration. Here, both national as well as international migration issues – such as the European refugee crisis – will be considered. The aim of this chapter is to understand the Christian perspective on the topic of immigration to the UK and the position of the Church. While the predominant focus will be on the Church of England, cross-denominational Christian teaching will be used. Rather than providing a critique, this chapter will seek to better understand Christian teaching and attitudes towards migration.

Finally, Chapter 5 will seek to draw some conclusions based on bridging the gap between the mostly isolated political, economic and social spheres of research.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> European Commission, 'Forced Displacement: Refugees, Asylum-Seekers and Internally Displaced People (IDPs)'; [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/refugee-crisis\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/refugee-crisis_en).

<sup>2</sup> Amy Sherman, 'Donald Trump wrongly says the Number of Illegal Immigrants is 30 million or Higher', *Politifact Florida*, 28 July 2015; [www.politifact.com/florida/statements/2015/jul/28/donald-trump/donald-trump-says-number-illegal-immigrants-30-mil](http://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/2015/jul/28/donald-trump/donald-trump-says-number-illegal-immigrants-30-mil).

<sup>3</sup> *BBC News*, 'Donald Trump: Mexico will Pay for Wall, 100%', 1 September 2016; [www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-us-2016-37241284](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-us-2016-37241284).

<sup>4</sup> Asa Bennett, 'Did Britain really vote Brexit to cut Immigration?', 29 June 2016; [www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/29/did-britain-really-vote-brexit-to-cut-immigration](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/29/did-britain-really-vote-brexit-to-cut-immigration).

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Independent Commission on Multilateralism, 'Migration is a Defining Issue of Our Time: Q&A with William Lacy Swing'; [www.icm2016.org/migration-is-a-defining-issue-of-our-time-q-a-with-william-lacy-swing](http://www.icm2016.org/migration-is-a-defining-issue-of-our-time-q-a-with-william-lacy-swing).

<sup>7</sup> The terms 'migration' and 'immigration' will be used interchangeably.

CHAPTER 1

---

POST-WAR BRITAIN AND  
CULTURAL INTEGRATION

## THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The history of European migration is crucial to understanding the history of the British Isles. Archaeological evidence suggests that the earliest human presence was in Ireland and dates back as far as 10,500 BC.<sup>1</sup> Yet the exact date remains a point of controversy due to the lack of written records. Reliable historical manuscripts only exist from around 55 BC, when Julius Caesar led the first Roman invasion of Great Britain.<sup>2</sup> The pre-Roman Celts, the Anglo-Saxons, the Norse and the French – over a longer period – are the main ancestral contributors to what we would now define as the ‘British’ people. The various fractions have battled across the British Isles from Roman times to the end of the Angevin Empire in the thirteenth century.<sup>3</sup>

The ‘Age of the Explorers’ marks a critical shift in British history because it enabled a truly global reach, the exchange of goods and services as well as setting the foundations for what would become the British Empire. Throughout the Elizabethan era, prominent explorers such as John Cabot, Francis Drake and John Hawkins brought the English into contact with the rest of the world. Starting from the early sixteenth century, the British imperial expansion created a vast number of crucial trading routes that facilitated the Empire’s growth, power and global influence. At its peak in the mid-nineteenth century it had established itself as the largest empire in history and the foremost global power of its time.<sup>4</sup> Yet around a century and two world wars later, the British Empire would follow in the footsteps of every other imperial power in history and come to an end by the late 1900s. Rhodesia<sup>5</sup> – now Zimbabwe – declared independence in 1980 as Britain’s last African colony,<sup>6</sup> and as of 2012, former imperial territories that have not chosen independence or have voted to retain British allegiance are known as ‘British Overseas Territories’. In these cases local governments maintain national autonomy but matters of defence and foreign affairs are managed by the UK.<sup>7</sup> Most countries formerly under the British Empire are now part of the Commonwealth – an intergovernmental organisation of 52 member states that cooperate in the advancement of democracy and development.<sup>8</sup>

The devastating infrastructural and social consequences of the Second World War meant that in the immediate post-war years Britain was facing a serious shortage of labour. It was predominantly migrant workers from the Commonwealth who helped fill this workforce deficit. The largest groups arrived from the West Indies in the 1950s and from India and Pakistan in the 1960s. Although Britain experienced migration inflows before the middle of the twentieth century, most of them were, by comparison, small in scale and had negligible impact on the national demographic. For this reason, this chapter will exclusively focus on post-Second World War migration and the interplay between social change, political responses and cultural tension.

Historical legislative records tell us that the ‘official’ start of British Commonwealth migration began with the British Nationality Act 1948, which opened Britain’s doors to all Commonwealth citizens. Migrants did arrive before 1948 but the Act itself formalised the border opening. The complete title of the Act read: ‘An Act to make provision for British nationality and for citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid’.<sup>9</sup>

The scars of the Second World War were so pronounced within the UK as well as throughout the European continent, that Britain found itself in dire need of a workforce that could support the post-war reconstruction effort. With most of Europe in ruins, the Commonwealth was not only the logical choice for an immediate workforce, it was also the only realistic option for the Prime Minister, Clement Atlee. Often described by Churchill as ‘a sheep in sheep’s clothing’, Atlee didn’t allow his shy and rather uncharismatic demeanour to stand in the way of achieving widespread domestic reforms – chief among which was the establishment of the National Health Service in 1948 and, in the same year, the British Nationality Act.

## CHALLENGES OF RACIAL AND CULTURAL INTEGRATION

The period of free entry lasted 14 years, from 1948 to 1962, when the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of that year began a string of legislation that gradually regulated and restricted Commonwealth immigration – the British Nationality Act 1964, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968,

the Immigration Act 1971 and so on. Nonetheless, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 is often regarded as an important piece of legislation because, for the first time, issues of race and ethnicity played a significant role in shaping British domestic policy. Hugh Gaitskell, who was leader of the Labour opposition at the time, labelled the act as ‘cruel and brutal anti-colour legislation’.<sup>10</sup>

The evolution of the newly arrived British communities from the Commonwealth – South Asia in particular – was by no means simple and straightforward. From the early 1950s it presented a complex struggle between issues of integration and separation, coupled with an array of racial and social tensions. This was well illustrated in the public stir that the arrival of the iconic cruise liner *Empire Windrush* created in 1948. Around 500 migrants from the Caribbean arrived on British shores with the hope of building a new life in the ‘Mother Country’. Yet the public response to this event was a rather mixed picture: ‘Welcome Home!’ read the front page of the *London Evening Standard* on that day. Yet despite a ‘relatively warm welcome from the press, racial tension amongst fellow citizens was rife. Unofficial “colour bars” were introduced, and workplace discrimination was commonplace.’<sup>11</sup> One official from the Home Office said that:

[Employers] were quite happy to employ coloured people, providing they weren’t visible. In other words, if they worked in the kitchens that was alright, but employers felt that shoppers wouldn’t like to see coloured hands handling food. They thought that ladies wouldn’t be happy to buy their underwear from coloured girls.<sup>12</sup>

The paradox in accepting and integrating the ‘other’ was becoming ever more evident in British society. On the one hand, many were warmly welcoming the ‘children of the Empire’, yet at the same time the former imperial prejudices remained imbedded in the minds of a wide portion of the British public. Commonwealth migrants from around the former Empire arrived in the UK predominantly driven by economic incentives. As



some have observed, ‘wages for labouring jobs in Britain . . . were over thirty times those offered for similar jobs in Pakistan.’<sup>13</sup>

It is no surprise, then, that as the number of Commonwealth migrants grew, so did the racial tensions. Peter Griffiths won his seat as an MP in the 1964 general election by running his campaign catch-line, ‘If you want a nigger for a neighbour, vote Labour!’<sup>14</sup> While controversial, Griffiths won the constituency of Smethwick with a 7.2% swing for the Tories, defeating Patrick Gordon Walker, who was Labour’s Shadow Foreign Secretary at the time. When questioned by the press, Griffiths refused to disown his slogan: ‘I would not condemn any man who said that . . . I regard it as a manifestation of popular feeling.’<sup>15</sup>

Only a few years after Griffiths’ campaign, Enoch Powell appeared to seize this ‘popular feeling’ against Commonwealth migrants in his famous ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech in Birmingham in 1968. Here he vociferously argued against the past, present and future inflow of Commonwealth migrants:

a decent, ordinary fellow Englishman . . . says to me . . . that his country will not be worth living in for his children . . . What he is saying, thousands and hundreds of thousands are saying and thinking – not throughout Great Britain, perhaps, but in the areas that are already undergoing the total transformation to which there is no parallel in a thousand years of English history . . . We must be mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependants, who are for the most part the material of the future growth of the immigrant-descended population. It is like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre.<sup>16</sup>

Whether Powell’s remarks have their roots in ethnic racism, or he opportunistically voiced a public concern, remains an issue of debate. It is certain, however, that the speech caused much controversy in British politics – so much so that Edward Heath, then Conservative Party leader, dismissed Powell from his shadow cabinet position. Yet according to some analysts it was Powell’s stance on immigration that played a major role in the Conservatives winning the 1970 general election.<sup>17</sup>

At this stage it is worth asking two questions:

- Can ‘racism’ be defined?
- What exactly is ‘racism’?

Racism is a complex and amorphous concept that can be interpreted in a variety of ways. From matters of colour, culture, ethnicity or religion, racism can be present in numerous situations and circumstances. The online Oxford dictionary describes the root definition of racism as ‘the belief that all members of each race possess characteristics, abilities, or qualities specific to that race, especially so as to distinguish it as inferior or superior to another race or races’.<sup>18</sup> While that places an emphasis on skin colour and ethnicity, the United Nations offers a broader definition of ‘racial discrimination’ as being:

any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.<sup>19</sup>

Ever since their arrival in the 1950s and 1960s, the British Commonwealth migrants faced changing forms and degrees of racism – from conflicts of colour to cultural and religious issues.

Tariq Modood, Professor of Sociology at the University of Bristol, argues, for instance, that racism against British Muslim communities has gone through two rather distinct stages: colour racism from the 1960s until the 1980s, and cultural racism from the early 1990s up to present day.<sup>20</sup>

Colour racism did not target only British South Asian Muslims, but the larger non-white migrant community as a whole. ‘Black as a political colour’,

a concept scrutinised by Anandi Ramamurthy, Reader in Post-Colonial Cultures at Sheffield Hallam University, who argues how all Commonwealth migrants of colour united in the common struggle against colour racism, regardless of religion or ethnic background:<sup>21</sup>

They did not see black simply as a skin colour but as a political position . . . the term ‘black’ enabled a collective identity and solidarity to develop in the struggle against both the racism of the street and the institutional racism of immigration laws . . . As Anwar Qadir, a member of Bradford Asian Youth Movement (AYM) put it: ‘I am and will always be a Kashmiri but, when you have a common enemy at the door, then people have to unite to deal with the beast.’<sup>22</sup>

According to Modood, colour racism would eventually evolve into a form of cultural racism. During the 1980s, seminal events such as the Honeyford affair in 1985 and the Rushdie affair in 1989 heavily contributed to this shift.<sup>23</sup> The main reason for this divide along cultural and more specifically religious lines was the fact that the Honeyford and Rushdie affairs involved almost entirely an Islamic–secularist conflict. Thus the British South Asian Muslim community clashed with the wider secular British society. A point to be made here is that both ethnic and religious tensions represent key factors that have shaped the integration and character of Commonwealth minorities in the UK.

## MULTICULTURALISM AND INTEGRATION

Britain is faced with a pertinent question: how can communities that hold fundamentally different cultural values be successfully integrated within British society?

An initial first step was the adoption and promotion of state ‘multiculturalism’; that is, the broad idea that ethnically and culturally diverse groups can live together without relinquishing or diminishing their ancestral heritage. Terry Wotherspoon and Paul Jungbluth refer to multiculturalism as ‘the

recognition of a social reality in which diverse cultures coexist within a given nation or territory'.<sup>24</sup> Although elements of multiculturalism existed in the 1970s and 1980s, it was not until 'New Labour' and Tony Blair's election as Prime Minister in 1997 that it officially became government policy.<sup>25</sup> At the time the ideological premise of multiculturalism was compelling. It promised to establish a modern, tolerant and open society, one in which cultural and religious differences were not just protected but championed, diversity adding richness to society and encouraging its citizens to celebrate and respect the 'other'. Professor Lord Bhikhu Parekh of the University of Westminster claims that multiculturalism is 'about intercultural fusion in which a culture borrows bits of others and creatively transforms both itself and them'.<sup>26</sup> Tariq Modood says it is 'integration which recognises group identities and heritage'.<sup>27</sup>

So how have things played out? Did an 'intercultural fusion' actually take place? Can there be both 'integration' and the recognition of 'group identities'? Events like the 9/11 attacks, the 7/7 London bombings, the 2007 Glasgow Airport attack and more recently the Westminster Bridge attack and Manchester Arena bombings point to a deeply divided society. They suggest that the side effect of multiculturalism has been segregation and alienation; British society has become far more akin to a salad bowl than a melting pot. Multiculturalism's concept of unity in diversity may sound great in theory, but in practice, diversity has come at the expense of unity.

A wide array of high-level European politicians have recognised the failure of multiculturalism. Angela Merkel said in a speech in 2010 that multiculturalism has 'utterly failed'.<sup>28</sup> In 2011 David Cameron said that state multiculturalism has 'failed' and that the 'UK needs to promote a stronger national identity'.<sup>29</sup> He argued in favour of restricting any state funding to any Islamic group that fails to recognise women's rights and that fosters extremist ideology.<sup>30</sup> Theresa May said in 2015 that 'When immigration is too high, when the pace of change is too fast, it's impossible to build a cohesive society'.<sup>31</sup> In a more recent speech on terrorism she has also said that there 'has been far too much tolerance of extremism in the UK . . . [Britain] needs to become far more robust in identifying and stomping it out across the public sector and society'.<sup>32</sup>

So what should future immigration policy look like? We will touch more on this question at a later stage but the overarching principle is this: future immigration policy must work towards promoting cohesion and preserving the fabric of society. Since Britain benefits from over half a century of immigration policy-making experience, it would be irresponsible to repeat the mistakes of the past. Far greater emphasis must be placed on the integration of migrant communities rather than, for instance, the numbers of migrants coming in. Asking ‘Who?’ is just as important as asking ‘How many?’ Migration policy must be driven by the historical record of successful – and unsuccessful – migrant integration in the UK. Decision-makers must ask themselves: ‘How likely is it that 10, 20 or even 30 years down the line, migrants from country X or Y will integrate into British society?’

Indeed, some will ask ‘Why should they integrate?’ or ‘To what extent?’ Both are valid questions. Yet again, looking back at the failures of state multiculturalism, one cannot help but conclude that there needs to be a stronger sense of unity and cohesion in society, primarily to prevent the disasters caused by segregation and unfettered alienation – home-grown terrorism perhaps being the most pertinent example. Ofsted lists the five ‘fundamental British values’ as: democracy; the rule of law; individual liberty; mutual respect and tolerance of those of different faiths; and beliefs.<sup>33</sup> It is crucial to understand that migration policy is far more than just a numbers game – the social and cultural implications carry just as much weight.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Richard Bradley, *The Prehistory of Britain and Ireland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Cassius Dio, *The Roman History*; [http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cassius\\_Dio/39\\*.html#50](http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cassius_Dio/39*.html#50).

<sup>3</sup> Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘Angevin Empire’; [www.britannica.com/place/Angevin-empire](http://www.britannica.com/place/Angevin-empire).

<sup>4</sup> Niall Ferguson, *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World* (London: Penguin, 2004), p. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Rhodesia – as it then was – unilaterally declared independence in November 1965. It was de facto independent from that time. However, the UK did not recognise independence until 1980, following the collapse of the white minority regime and the holding of elections based on universal suffrage.

<sup>6</sup> BBC, *On This Day*; [http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/january/27/newsid\\_2506000/2506219.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/january/27/newsid_2506000/2506219.stm).

<sup>7</sup> Policy: UK Overseas Territories; [www.gov.uk/government/policies/uk-overseas-territories](http://www.gov.uk/government/policies/uk-overseas-territories).

<sup>8</sup> Commonwealth Secretariat, 'The Commonwealth', 19 June 2010; [https://web.archive.org/web/20100619122827/http://thecommonwealth.org/Internal/191086/191247/the\\_commonwealth](https://web.archive.org/web/20100619122827/http://thecommonwealth.org/Internal/191086/191247/the_commonwealth).

<sup>9</sup> British Nationality Act, 1948; [www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1948/56/pdfs/ukpga\\_19480056\\_en.pdf](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1948/56/pdfs/ukpga_19480056_en.pdf).

<sup>10</sup> Don Flynn, 30 January 2012, 'Marking 50 years of Commonwealth Immigration Controls'; [www.migrantsrights.org.uk/blog/2012/01/marking-50-years-commonwealth-immigration-controls](http://www.migrantsrights.org.uk/blog/2012/01/marking-50-years-commonwealth-immigration-controls).

<sup>11</sup> Saffron Alexander, 'Windrush Generation: "They Thought we Should be Planting Bananas"'; [www.telegraph.co.uk/goodlife/11683233/Windrush-Generation-They-thought-we-should-be-planting-bananas.html](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/goodlife/11683233/Windrush-Generation-They-thought-we-should-be-planting-bananas.html).

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Alison Shaw, *A Pakistani Community in Britain* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), p. 9, quoted in Philip Lewis, *Islamic Britain: Religion, Politics and Identity among British Muslims* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994), p. 16.

<sup>14</sup> Robert Winder, *Bloody Foreigners: The Story of Immigration to Britain* (London: Little, Brown, 2004), p. 374.

<sup>15</sup> Stuart Jeffries, 'Britain's Most Racist Election: The Story of Smethwick, 50 Years On', *The Guardian*, 15 October 2015; [www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/15/britains-most-racist-election-smethwick-50-years-on](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/15/britains-most-racist-election-smethwick-50-years-on).

<sup>16</sup> Enoch Powell, *Freedom and Reality* (London: Batsford, 1969).

<sup>17</sup> Iain McLean, *Rational Choice and British Politics: An Analysis of Rhetoric and Manipulation from Peel to Blair* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 129–30.

<sup>18</sup> <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/racism>.

<sup>19</sup> United Nations, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Article 1; [www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx](http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx).

<sup>20</sup> Tariq Modood, *Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), p. 8.

<sup>21</sup> Anandi Ramamurthy, 'The Politics of Britain's Asian Youth Movements', *Race and Class* 48:2 (2006), pp. 38–60 (p. 44).

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45.

<sup>23</sup> For more information, see Daniel Pipes, *The Rushdie Affair: The Novel, the Ayatollah and the West* (New York: Birch Lane Press, 1990; 2nd edn, Abingdon: Routledge, 2017). On the Honeyford affair, see Roger Scruton's intriguing piece in *The Spectator*, 'Let's Face it – Ray Honeyford got it Right on Islam and Education'; [www.spectator.co.uk/2014/07/the-bradford-head-teacher-who-got-it-right-on-islam-and-education](http://www.spectator.co.uk/2014/07/the-bradford-head-teacher-who-got-it-right-on-islam-and-education), 5 July 2014.

<sup>24</sup> Terry Wotherspoon and Paul Jungbluth, 'Multiculturalism and Education in Changing Political Economies', in Terry Wotherspoon and Paul Jungbluth (eds), *Multicultural Education in a Changing Global Economy: Canada and the Netherlands* (Münster/New York: Waxmann, 1995), p. 1.

<sup>25</sup> Brian Wheeler, 'Tony Blair's Legacy 20 Years On', *BBC News*, 1 May 2017; [www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-39717751](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-39717751).

<sup>26</sup> Antony Lerman, 'In Defence of Multiculturalism', *The Guardian*, 22 March 2010; [www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/mar/22/multiculturalism-blame-culture-segregation](http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/mar/22/multiculturalism-blame-culture-segregation).

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> Matthew Weaver, 'Angela Merkel: German Multiculturalism has Utterly Failed', *The Guardian*, 17 October 2017; [www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-german-multiculturalism-failed](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-german-multiculturalism-failed).

<sup>29</sup> *BBC News*, 'State Multiculturalism has Failed, says David Cameron', 5 February 2011; [www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994).

<sup>30</sup> Oliver Wright, 'Cameron: My War on Multiculturalism', *The Independent*, 5 February 2011; [www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/cameron-my-war-on-multiculturalism-2205074.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/cameron-my-war-on-multiculturalism-2205074.html).

<sup>31</sup> Jon Stone, 'What Theresa May said about Immigration in her Infamous Speech to Tory Conference', *The Independent*, 26 August 2016; [www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-immigration-policies-speech-conference-2015-tory-conservative-party-views-a7209931.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-immigration-policies-speech-conference-2015-tory-conservative-party-views-a7209931.html).

<sup>32</sup> David Williamson, 'The Eight key Messages in Theresa May's "Enough is Enough" Terrorism Speech', *Wales Online*, 4 June 2017; [www.walesonline.co.uk/news/politics/eight-key-messages-theresa-mays-13135264](http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/politics/eight-key-messages-theresa-mays-13135264).

<sup>33</sup> Young Citizens, 'What are British Values?', 2018; [www.doingsmsc.org.uk/british-values](http://www.doingsmsc.org.uk/british-values).



## CHAPTER 2

---

# BRITAIN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

## LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Let us step back for a moment and take a historical look at how Westminster policy was responding to Britain's demographic changes.

Throughout the early 1970s Britain found itself at a political crossroad, split between closer ties with the European continent and an increasingly restrictive immigration policy towards the former Commonwealth.

After Charles de Gaulle vetoed Britain's application to the European Economic Community (EEC) twice, in 1962 and 1967, the UK finally succeeded in joining in 1973.<sup>1</sup> In a contemporary legal article on the Immigration Act 1971, J. M. Evans of Osgoode Hall Law School believed that it was:

surely no coincidence that the Act was passed less than four months before the Government signed the Treaty of Accession to the European Economic Communities. The Act will probably not be the final stage in the process of shedding the vestiges of Empire, for it is foreseeable that a new definition of United Kingdom citizenship will be formulated which will determine both civic and immigration rights.<sup>2</sup>

Evans argued that Britain was slowly shifting its focus from the Commonwealth to the European continent. On becoming a full EEC member in 1973, Prime Minister Edward Heath enthusiastically stated that 'For my part, I have no doubt at all that the discussions which we have had will prove of real and lasting benefit, not only to Britain and France, but to Europe as a whole.'<sup>3</sup> The impact of this European integration process would be that 'nationals of Member States of the EEC will enter [the UK] on more favourable terms than non-patrial Commonwealth citizens.'<sup>4</sup>

As mentioned earlier, the open-door policy of 1948 to Commonwealth citizens was long closed before the Immigration Act 1971. This legislative

trend in restricting Commonwealth immigration began with the passage of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, which was further strengthened by the British Nationality Act 1964, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 and so on. The overall effect of these legislative measures was to give 'a more privileged status to Citizens of the UK and Colonies (CUKC's) that have a "close connection" with the UK itself than a close connection with the Colonies, or with former Colonies that had become independent'.<sup>5</sup> In other words, Commonwealth citizens with family and economic connections (usually workplace) in the UK were prioritised ahead of Commonwealth citizens with less or no connection to Britain – the closer the connection, the higher the chance of entry.

Looking back, the 1962 Act created a period of tension for the Commonwealth minority – mainly working men – already present in Britain. Up until 1962 the primary objective for working Commonwealth men settled in the UK was to send money back to their respective home countries. This radically changed in the beat-the-ban rush of 1961, in which over '130,000 migrants had entered Britain, a colossal increase – roughly equivalent to the previous five years put together'.<sup>6</sup> The effective 'ban' brought by the 1962 Act made migrant workers hesitant to return home in fear that they might never be granted entry back into the UK. The overall result of the ban was that it established a permanent Commonwealth community in Britain: 'The original point of migration – to support the family at home – dissolved'.<sup>7</sup> Yet this shift in emphasis may not be as clear-cut, as the remittance of money remains common practice today.

Harold Wilson became Prime Minister in the general election of 1964, and although Labour was initially against the 1962 Act, it now set about strengthening it by reducing the number of entry vouchers from 20,000 to 8,500 per year. Interestingly enough, the Race Relations Act was passed in 1965 and the Race Relations Board established in 1966. The former made 'outright' discrimination illegal while the latter dealt with discriminatory related issues.<sup>8</sup>

In similar fashion, the Commonwealth Immigration Act 1968 continued the ongoing trend of restricting Commonwealth immigration to the UK. More precisely, it made full British citizenship only available to 'those with a parent or grandparent born, adopted or naturalised in the UK'.<sup>9</sup>

## **‘The Commonwealth Immigration Act 1968 continued the ongoing trend of restricting Commonwealth immigration’**

By the general election of 1970 there was widespread political agreement in both the Labour and Conservative parties over restricting Commonwealth immigration. The previous generalisation that Labour was more in support of liberal immigration laws and Conservatives more against them was now largely

void. However, the Conservative victory in the 1970 election meant even stricter immigration controls: ‘there would be no further large-scale permanent immigration’,<sup>10</sup> the Conservatives pledged in their campaign.

The changes in immigration policy presented above set the foundations for the Immigration Act 1971. It was an Act that responded to the political demands of the day, and here we can observe how ‘race relation issues enter into the structures, strategies and ideologies of political parties’.<sup>11</sup>

The 1971 Act can also be seen as a political piece of legislation in the sense that it was influenced and driven by the politics of race and ethnicity. It was a continuation of the post-1962 political trend with respect to increasingly stringent Commonwealth migration policy.

In this sense it brought substantial changes to the notion of British citizenship. One of the major changes was the newly defined concept of ‘patriality’. British and Commonwealth citizens were divided between those who qualified as ‘patrials’ and those who qualified as ‘non-patrials’. The former had the right to live in the UK, the latter did not. Those who qualified as patrials fell mainly into two categories:

- a) Citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies who had that citizenship by birth, adoption, naturalisation or registration in the United Kingdom, or who were born of parents, one of whom had United Kingdom citizenship by birth, or one of whose grandparents had such citizenship; and

b) Citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies who had at any time settled in the United Kingdom and who had been ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom for five years or more.<sup>12</sup>

John Solomos argues in his book *Black Youth, Racism and the State* that the 1971 Act ‘completed the course of action signalled by the 1962 Act: it took away the right of black Commonwealth migrants to settle in Britain. It represented the culmination of what was popularly seen as a “White Britain Policy”.’<sup>13</sup>

In terms of economic aspects, the new law extended greater controls over the immigrant non-patrial working community. It introduced the annually renewable work permit, by which a non-patrial is permitted to reside in Britain as long as he/she maintains employment. Ian Macdonald argued that ‘the threat of deportation hung over the head of every new [non-patrial] immigrant in Britain’.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, any non-patrial who committed a crime or ended up involved with the police would be likely to face deportation. Restrictions and government surveillance over non-patrials were highly enhanced by the 1971 Act. The government was now permitted not only to deport the individual who was not ‘conductive to the public good’, but also his family.

We can therefore see the tensions that the 1971 Act created between patrial and non-patrial migrants. In this case it is useful to see how national British legislation was heavily driven by the politics of race and immigration.

The 1971 Act is important because it represents a shift in the direction that Britain took from the former Commonwealth and towards the European continent, more specifically the EEC. Therefore some of the main goals of the 1971 Act were:

First there was the problem of numbers: “The broad purpose of [the Act] was to enable the [Home Secretary] to limit the numbers of Commonwealth immigrants entering this country.”<sup>15</sup>

The second aim of the act was to reduce racial tension: ‘The main purpose of immigration policy . . . is as a contribution to . . . peace and harmony’, said the Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling.<sup>16</sup> The argument underlying this legislation was that restricting non-white immigration would reduce racial tensions. This assumes that the predominantly non-white, Commonwealth migrants were the root cause of racial conflict – often it was the migrants themselves who were discriminated against.<sup>17</sup>

The third and last purpose of the Act is straightforward: ‘control of coloured immigration’: ‘The numbers, who qualify under the patrial clause, will be large and the vast majority will be of European extraction. That is a fact . . . I attach very great importance to recognising the special ties of blood and kinship’, said Maudling.<sup>18</sup>

It could be argued that the aims and purposes of the Immigration Act 1971 have been heavily clouded by what George Orwell would call ‘political talk’. The language used by politicians often masks the hidden aims that are too harsh or unfit for the general public to hear. This is particularly true in democracies where elected officials are dependent on votes. In consequence, political aims are often veiled in coded and vague political language:

Things like the continuance of British rule in India, the Russian purges and deportations, the dropping of the atom bombs on Japan, can indeed be defended, but only by arguments which are too brutal for most people to face, and which do not square with the professed aims of the political parties. Thus political language has to consist largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness.<sup>19</sup>

The 1971 Act is important because it marks the culmination of an increasingly restrictive immigration policy that started with the Act of 1962, as Britain tightened controls on Commonwealth migration and gradually began forming political, social and economic ties with the European continent.

We now turn briefly to consider some of the major developments that occurred within the European context.

## BRITAIN AND THE CONTINENT: THE FOUR PILLARS OF THE EU

The Single European Act (SEA) of 1986, and the context created by the fall of the Iron Curtain, set the stage for the creation of today's European Union. A key player in this period was Jacques Delors, a French economist and politician. Delors, who became President of the Commission in 1985, was commissioned in 1988 to chair a report on the concrete steps to be taken towards reaching economic union. He 'sought to infuse the Commission with a renewed sense of purpose and to deepen political and economic integration'.<sup>20</sup>

In terms of economic policy, the Single European Act was based on the 1957 Treaty of Rome that established the foundations of the European Economic Community (EEC). Yet the Treaty of Rome is perhaps best known for laying the groundwork in what would eventually become the 'Four Fundamental Freedoms' of the EU; that is, freedom of goods, services, capital and people.<sup>21</sup>

These four pillars are at the very core of the European project: closer integration between the nation states through the removal of barriers in goods, services,

**'These four pillars are  
at the very core of the  
European project'**

capital and the free movement of people. In effect, all European treaties, from Rome in 1957 to Lisbon in 2009, have consolidated – in various ways – and advanced the core freedoms.

For instance, the SEA had two major political and economic results, further developed by the Maastricht Treaty. Bearing in mind the Cold War context of the mid-1980s, the first important conclusion was that 'member states [should] coordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security . . . and endeavour jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy'.<sup>22</sup> The second important goal of the SEA was to develop an internal market that could effectively be 'an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured'.<sup>23</sup>

Delors went one step further, arguing that the SEA needed ‘a certain monetary capacity [that would bring about] an alignment of economic policies [within the EEC] and outside would enable Europe to make its voice heard more strongly in the world of economic, financial and monetary matters’.<sup>24</sup> Both aspects would be highly advanced by the establishment of the European Monetary Union and the Treaty on European Union as part of the Maastricht Treaty.

The period between the completion of the SEA in 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty ratification in 1993 marked seven years of dramatic change, both regionally and globally. The late 1980s were the final culminating years of the Cold War era. Events such as the fall of communism in former Soviet satellite states and, more importantly, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 sparked major changes within the perspectives of European integration. The reunification of Germany brought back the nostalgic feeling of the brutal war years. In an effort to refute any sense of fear, the first Chancellor of the newly reunified Germany, Helmut Kohl, assured the people of Europe that ‘the future architecture of Germany must be fitted into the future architecture of Europe as a whole’.<sup>25</sup> Democratisation processes began in all the former communist states, offering new perspectives for closer cooperation in an ‘extended’ Europe. Furthermore, the growing enthusiasm for a common market was justified by numerous European companies expanding beyond their conventional state borders. As noted by Desmond Dinan, ‘sixty-eight major mergers and acquisitions took place in 1986; by contrast 300 happened the following year’.<sup>26</sup> This led Delors to conduct and organise a series of meetings with bankers and professionals to assess the possibility of the European Monetary Union. All the events presented above collectively set the stage for the Treaty of Maastricht in the early 1990s.

The Maastricht Treaty established the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the Treaty on European Union (TEU). It also paved the way for further developments, such as the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 and the Treaty of Nice in 2001. In practical terms, it created the notion of European citizenship, with all its rights and responsibilities, including the freedom to travel and work, the notion of solidarity and the question of social cohesion.



It also created the framework for unprecedented possibilities of economic exchange and development – the single currency market – again with all its advantages and disadvantages. The four freedoms proved to be a powerful compass in guiding the overall process of European integration.

Where does the UK fit in all this? France and Germany saw the mutual economic and political benefits of the EMU and therefore represented a powerful partnership in advancing the greater European cause. The UK, however, had a far more Eurosceptic approach. Margaret Thatcher opposed these developments and perceived Delors to be ‘the root of all evil: a French Socialist determined to establish an undemocratic European superstate’.<sup>27</sup> However, according to Charles Powell, Thatcher’s foreign affairs private secretary, she never had a ‘single, consistent view of Europe throughout her political life’.<sup>28</sup> She spoke highly of an increase in European military and defence cooperation yet opposed policies that would strengthen the supranational powers of the European institutions.<sup>29</sup> The UK, through Thatcher, maintained its historically prudent and rather isolationist approach towards European affairs.

The tone changed with John Major’s term in office. Major favoured a closer relationship with the continent and further political and economic integration. As he famously said in 1991: ‘I want to place Britain at the heart of Europe . . . No-one should fear we will lose our national identity . . . I want Britain to inspire and to shape Europe as decisively as we have over the Single Market programme.’<sup>30</sup> Inevitably Major’s approach created fresh conflicts within his party, forcing him to drop important components of his economic policy, and including the UK’s withdrawal from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM).<sup>31</sup> He was also forced to secure several opt-outs from the Maastricht Treaty on social policy and on membership of the single currency.<sup>32</sup>

One could argue that under the premiership of Tony Blair, the rapprochement with the European continent continued. Like Major, Blair favoured closer political, social and economic integration with Europe, but his approach to Europe, unlike Major’s, came under his new vision for Britain and his overarching national ‘modernisation agenda’.<sup>33</sup> Throughout Blair’s decade in power, government immigration and integration policy shifted focus

to ‘a more proactive, strategic approach . . . putting economic benefit at the heart of [legislative] reforms’.<sup>34</sup> For instance, Blair viewed high-skilled migration as an important component to the nation’s economic prosperity (the number of international students studying in the UK rose from 70,000 in 1997 to 120,000 in 2004<sup>35</sup>).

But what impact did these political developments at a national as well as European level have on migration to the UK? The Maastricht Treaty is important because it is the first European treaty signed by all member states that changed the ‘labour worker’ provision to a free movement of EU ‘citizens’.<sup>36</sup> For the first time, all citizens of signatory member states were eligible to travel, work and resettle within the EU, thus introducing the notion of European citizenship.

The ‘eastern expansion’ of the European Union between 2004 and 2007 with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria created a union of member states with similar aspirational core values of freedom, democracy and rule of law but with significantly different levels of economic development. The discrepancy in income has led to a steady migrant flow from poorer member states in Eastern Europe to richer states in Western Europe, such as France, Germany and the UK.

This section has considered the historical and political account of migration to the UK from 1945 to the present day. We have seen how the dynamics between international and national pressures led to the political responses of successive British governments. More exactly, we have seen how Britain moved from an open-door policy with the Commonwealth that ended with the Immigration Act 1971, to membership of the European Communities – now the European Union – in the 1975 referendum.

## GLOBALISATION AND THE NATION STATE

Before analysing the impact of migration on the UK’s national economy it is useful to bring a degree of theoretical framework to our understanding of globalisation, the independent nation state and civil society.

The concept of civil society originates from ancient Greek philosophy, yet the linguistic origin comes from the Latin translation of *societas civilis*. For

much of history the concept of civil society ‘allowed no distinction between “state” and “society” or between political and civil society: it simply meant a community, a collection of human beings united within a legitimate political order’.<sup>37</sup> The distinction between the state and its governed people as two separate bodies only emerged later, following Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Friedrich Hegel and their contributions to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political thought. Hobbes’ magnum opus, *The Leviathan*, was based on the state and its subjects, which were bounded together by the ‘social contract’. Locke’s ‘state of nature’ concept was that:

Those who are united into one body, and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide controversies between them, and punish offenders, are in civil society one with another; but those who have no such common appeal . . . are still in the state of Nature.<sup>38</sup>

It is important to note that both Locke and Hobbes viewed civil society as intrinsically part of government, and thus still far from our current understanding. It was Hegel who, in response to the conflicts of modern commercial society, introduced the separation of – and distinction between – the ‘state’ and ‘civil society’.<sup>39</sup> In his thinking, ‘the individual need for recognition (and hence existence) is attained through the recognition of property. Indeed, for Hegel property in the realm of civil society takes the place of love in the realm of family’.<sup>40</sup> In this sense, Hegel believed that civil society, while distinct from the family, was also distinct from the state in what he would call *Sittlichkeit* or ‘ethical life’.<sup>41</sup> Hegel is arguably one of the most influential figures in leading to the gradual separation of civil society and the state itself.

If, then, the nation state and its respective civil society is the de facto unit of government, in what way would globalisation’s transnational forces impact the nation state? It is useful to step back for a moment and consider this question through the lens of free trade market economics. The Scottish philosopher and economist Adam Smith famously argued in his magnum opus, *The Wealth of Nations*, that it ‘is not from the benevolence of the butcher,

the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.<sup>42</sup> Despite being driven by self-interest, a competitive and free market economy brings the forces of supply and demand into equilibrium. The ‘invisible hand’ ensures a fair price for both consumers and suppliers. It can also help in combating greed, as over-chargers will be undercut by the competition and put out of business.

Smith believed in the free market as the supreme form of economic organisation. He argued that countries with a more specialised economy will have a significant competitive advantage over those with a basic level of specialisation – in production or services, for example. The legacy of his work has had a tremendous impact on neoliberal economic thought.

Looking back at the UK, the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 is often seen as a symbol of Britain’s shift from a more protectionist trade policy to a liberalisation of the markets. Sir

Robert Peel, who was Prime Minister at the time, was persuaded to repeal the corn laws following the failure of the Irish potato crop in 1845.<sup>43</sup> It marked a pivotal moment in the opening of trade beyond the borders of the nation state.

However, it was not all smooth sailing thereafter. In the next century, hit by the effects of the Great Depression, the UK economy took a sharp downturn. Record unemployment, high interest rates and an overvaluation of the pound sterling left the Conservative government with no option but to repeal the gold standard in 1931. From 1934 the devaluation of the pound boosted exports and provided some signs of recovery. However, in 1932 British wheat became protected by statute in response to the country’s growing dependence on imported wheat.<sup>44</sup>

But how are these events relevant? They are relevant because an understanding of the history of free trade enables us to have a better understanding of the current economic context. They created a path that would enable the proliferation of free trade on an unprecedented scale. This shift also created

**‘In what way would  
globalisation’s  
transnational forces  
impact the nation state?’**

many of today's intergovernmental institutions, like the establishment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1945, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, and subsequently the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Indeed, the EU's four fundamental principles of freedom of movement in capital, people, goods and services were shaped by the aforementioned events and have their ideology quite heavily rooted in Adam Smith's neoclassical line of thought.

Where does this leave civil society and globalisation? If we appreciate globalisation as a 'multidimensional, accelerated and interconnected organization of space and time across national borders',<sup>45</sup> it could be argued that globalisation has enabled civil society to act – and interact – beyond the confines of the nation state and at a global or, better said, transnational level. Political and strategic partnerships, such as the European Union or NATO, have increased the interconnectedness between the participating nation states. Therefore civil societies that were previously limited to the confines of the state have an increased freedom to move and amalgamate.

The EU remains a potent example of this phenomenon. While culturally and historically diverse, this collection of nation states share a degree of national sovereignty in exchange for a more powerful economic and political global voice. Within a framework of globalisation, this will inevitably give rise to trends in migratory flows from poor to comparatively rich countries. To a large extent this movement from poor to wealthier countries is exactly what has been happening within the EU over the last decade. Events such as the global economic crisis of 2007/8 and the euro crisis in Greece have only exacerbated this trend – the consequences of which, both positive and negative, remain to be seen.

David Goodhart, Director of the DEMOS think tank, argues that economic immigrants bring significant benefits to the 'rich' host countries: 'they plug skills gaps, fill "dirty" jobs and promote entrepreneurialism'; in the USA it is estimated that some 52% of all Silicon Valley start-ups are run by foreign-born nationals; the move from poor to rich countries also benefits the migrants themselves – a doctor from the Ivory Coast will earn six times more in France, and a construction worker from Eastern Europe will roughly triple his earnings in Germany or the UK.<sup>46</sup>

But what impact, if any, does this have on the countries of origin? It is clear that, statistically speaking, it is the young and healthy, the more educated and those with higher sets of skills who are more likely to emigrate. In the case of EU migrants in particular, research from the LSE has found that:

EU immigrants are more educated, younger, more likely to be in work and less likely to claim benefits than the UK-born. About 44% have some form of higher education compared with only 23% of the UK-born. About a third of EU immigrants live in London, compared with only 11% of the UK-born.

EU immigrants pay more in taxes than they take out in welfare and the use of public services. They therefore help reduce the budget deficit.

Immigrants do not have a negative effect on local services such as crime, education, health, or social housing.<sup>47</sup>

Yet what impact would this have on their respective countries of origin? Empirical evidence would suggest that the impact is negative. If a less-developed economy loses its best people to 'richer' countries, it implicitly hinders its speed and development of economic growth. As Goodhart rightly argues:

just as the marginal extra pound is worth more to a poor person than to a rich person, so the educated and ambitious person is worth more to a poor country that has few of them than to a rich country that already has many.<sup>48</sup>

However, there are some economic benefits for the countries of origin in the form of 'remittances'. Research from the World Bank shows that remittances from migrant workers are a substantial source of capital inflows to developing countries.<sup>49</sup> In addition to remittances, foreign migrant workers can learn new skills and trades that can be applied back in their

home country, thus widening the entrepreneurial prowess of the economy. Yet given the difficulties in generating quantifiable data, any argument relating to a 'brain drain' thesis should be approached with caution.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*, 3rd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 71.

<sup>2</sup> J. M. Evans, 'Immigration Act 1971', *The Modern Law Review* 35:5 (1972), pp. 508–24 (p. 508).

<sup>3</sup> UPI, '1971 Year in Review: Economic Crisis'; [www.upi.com/Audio/Year\\_in\\_Review/Events-of-1971/Economic-Crisis/12295509436546-2](http://www.upi.com/Audio/Year_in_Review/Events-of-1971/Economic-Crisis/12295509436546-2).

<sup>4</sup> Evans, 'Immigration Act 1971', p. 509.

<sup>5</sup> Ann Dummett and Ian Martin, *British Nationality: The AGIN Guide to the New Law* (London: National Council for Civil Liberties, 1982), p. 15.

<sup>6</sup> Robert Winder, *Bloody Foreigners: The Story of Immigration to Britain* (London: Little, Brown, 2004), p. 371.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 372.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 376.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 378.

<sup>10</sup> John Solomos, *Race and Racism in Britain*, 3rd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 62.

<sup>11</sup> Sami Zubaida (ed.), 'Introduction', in *Race and Racialism* (London: Tavistock, 1970), p. 141, quoted in Solomos, *ibid.*, p. 21.

<sup>12</sup> Ian A. Macdonald, *Immigration Law and Practice in the United Kingdom* (London: Butterworth, 1983), pp. 52–6, quoted in John Solomos, *Black Youth, Racism and the State: The Politics of Ideology and Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 40.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> Ian A. Macdonald, *The New Immigration Law* (London: Butterworth, 1972), p. 17.

<sup>15</sup> Lord Diplock, quoted in Macdonald, *ibid.*, p. 12.

<sup>16</sup> Macdonald, *ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 14–15.

<sup>18</sup> Reginald Maudling, quoted in Macdonald, *ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>19</sup> George Orwell, 'Politics and the English Language', in *A Collection of Essays* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1981), p. 166.

<sup>20</sup> Dinan, *ibid.*, p. 97.

<sup>21</sup> National Board of Trade, 'Single Market, Four Freedoms, Sixteen Facts', May 2015; [www.kommers.se/Documents/dokumentarkiv/publikationer/2015/Publ-single-market-4-freedoms-16-facts.pdf](http://www.kommers.se/Documents/dokumentarkiv/publikationer/2015/Publ-single-market-4-freedoms-16-facts.pdf).

<sup>22</sup> Dinan, *ibid.*, p. 108.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 109.

<sup>24</sup> Jacques Delors, quoted in Dinan, *ibid.*, pp. 109–10.

<sup>25</sup> Helmut Kohl, quoted in Dinan, *ibid.*, p. 115.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 112.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 233.

<sup>28</sup> Charles Powell, 'Margaret Thatcher had Failure and Success in Europe – but she was right to stand up for Britain', *Prospect Magazine*, 8 November 2017; [www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/charles-powell-margaret-thatcher-had-failure-and-success-in-europe-but-she-was-right-to-stand-up-for-britain](http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/charles-powell-margaret-thatcher-had-failure-and-success-in-europe-but-she-was-right-to-stand-up-for-britain).

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> John Major, 'Speech to Conservative Central Council', 1991; [www.johnmajor.co.uk/page2017.html](http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page2017.html).

<sup>31</sup> The 16th of September 1992 became known as 'Black Wednesday', when Major's Cabinet was forced to withdraw the pound sterling from the ERM. It is estimated that the inability to maintain the value of the pound within the ERM's limits cost the UK around £3.3bn.



<sup>32</sup> Gov.uk, 'Past Prime Ministers: Sir John Major'; [www.gov.uk/government/history/past-prime-ministers/john-major](http://www.gov.uk/government/history/past-prime-ministers/john-major).

<sup>33</sup> Simon Berleymont, 'Tony Blair and Europe', *Open Democracy*, 30 May 2007; [www.opendemocracy.net/tony\\_blair\\_and\\_europe.jsp](http://www.opendemocracy.net/tony_blair_and_europe.jsp).

<sup>34</sup> Will Somerville, 'The Immigration Legacy of Tony Blair', Migration Policy Institute; [www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigration-legacy-tony-blair](http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigration-legacy-tony-blair).

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Stefanie Linhardt, 'Europe on the Move: A Freedom too Far?', *The Banker*, October 2016; [www.cream-migration.org/files/EuropeOnTheMove.pdf](http://www.cream-migration.org/files/EuropeOnTheMove.pdf).

<sup>37</sup> Sunil Khilnani, 'The Development of Civil Society', in Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani (eds), *Civil Society: History and Possibilities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 17.

<sup>38</sup> John Locke, ed. Peter Laslett, *Two Treatises of Government*, The Second Treatise, §87 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 324.

<sup>39</sup> Khilnani, *ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>40</sup> Adam B. Seligman, 'Between Public and Private: Towards a Sociology of Civil Society', in Robert W. Hefner (ed.), *Democratic Civility: The History and Cross-Cultural Possibility of a Modern Political Ideal* (New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 82.

<sup>41</sup> Mark Alznauer, *Hegel's Theory of Responsibility* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 6.

<sup>42</sup> Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, 1776; <http://geolib.com/smith.adam/won1-02.html>.

<sup>43</sup> Encyclopaedia Britannica, 'Corn Laws'; [www.britannica.com/event/Corn-Law-British-history](http://www.britannica.com/event/Corn-Law-British-history).

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford, 'Political Globalization', in George Ritzer (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Globalization* (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2007), p. 414.

<sup>46</sup> David Goodhart, *The British Dream: Successes and Failures of Post-War Immigration* (London: Atlantic Books, 2013), p. 14.

<sup>47</sup> Jonathan Wadsworth, Swati Dhingra, Gianmarco Ottaviano and John Van Reenen, 'Brexit and the Impact of Immigration on the UK', LSE Centre for Economic Performance, May 2017; <http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit05.pdf>.

<sup>48</sup> Goodhart, *ibid.*, p. 21.

<sup>49</sup> World Bank, 'Remittances to Developing Countries will surpass \$400 Billion in 2012', 20 November 2012; <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1288990760745/MigrationDevelopmentBrief19.pdf>.

CHAPTER 3

---


THE ECONOMICS OF  
MIGRATION

## KEY FIGURES

There are myriad questions related to the topic of immigration that, given their unquantifiable nature, remain open to debate within the public sphere. Issues such as the level of migrant ‘integration’ within the host country, the impact on the national economy and even the migrant impact on public services require a more complex process of evaluation than some would think. There are, however, a series of facts and figures that remain relatively easier to measure. In this sense, the following section will focus exclusively on statistics that are readily available and help further the understanding of migration in the UK.

Figure 1 shows historical long-term net migration to the UK. The three simple yet important measurements are immigration (people coming in), emigration (people leaving the UK) and net migration (immigration less emigration). Here we can see how, throughout the second half of the twentieth century, the UK actually experienced prolonged periods of negative net migration – people leaving the country outnumbered those coming in.


FIGURE 1: UK NET MIGRATION



Negative net migration hit peaks of -87,000 in 1969 and -84,000 in 1974. This trend gradually reversed from the 1980s onwards. Positive net migration has steadily risen and thus far has reached peaks of 313,000 in 2014 and 332,000 in 2015 – far outnumbering any level of positive net migration that the UK has experienced in the post-war period.<sup>1</sup> From 2000 to 2015, over 3.7 million people moved to the UK.<sup>2</sup>

Figure 2 is a more focused illustration, showing immigration, emigration and net migration over the past decade (2006–16). While both UK immigration and emigration have experienced oscillation in numbers, the overarching conclusion is that emigration remains relatively stable and on a slight downward trend but immigration has proved more volatile and on an upward trend. The quarterly measurements of net migration show how the UK has experienced a steady increase in net migration from the second quarter of 2012 onwards.

FIGURE 2: LONG-TERM INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION




It is useful to dig deeper into these numbers and understand the major demographic groups that make up immigration and emigration. Figure 3 divides migration into three main categories: migration from EU countries; from non-EU countries; and British migration.

Since the 1990s the UK has experienced relatively high levels of non-EU migration in comparison to EU migration, and particularly in comparison to British emigration. Non-EU migration peaked in 2004, with 224,000

## **‘Non-EU migration has been consistently higher than EU migration’**


new arrivals. However, while British emigration has remained in constant positive figures (i.e. Britons leaving the UK outnumber those coming in), the gap between EU and non-EU immigration has gradually narrowed. It is important to note that non-EU migration has been consistently higher than EU migration. The latest official figures show that as of the second quarter of 2016, non-EU migrants totalled 196,000 while EU migrants accounted for 189,000. Upon the completion of the Brexit negotiations and the UK’s formal withdrawal from the EU, it is sensible to predict that the number of EU migrants coming to the UK will gradually decrease. Theresa May expressed support in continuing David Cameron’s immigration target of ‘reducing net migration to the tens of thousands’;<sup>3</sup> it remains to be seen whether this is achievable. One cannot help but ask two questions: first, how successful or otherwise has the historic policy of reducing Commonwealth immigration been; second, could or should government return to a similar policy?

FIGURE 3: BRITISH NET MIGRATION



It is also worth taking a look at the major groups that comprise both EU and non-EU migrants working in the UK – Figure 4<sup>4</sup> shows the breakdown.

FIGURE 4: ORIGINS OF MIGRATION



Data from the Labour Force Survey shows that the major EU ethnic groups working in the UK are from Poland (29%), Ireland (12%), Portugal and Romania (both 7%). The predominant non-EU groups are from India (15%), Pakistan and Bangladesh (9%) and Africa (16% – excluding South Africa). What is important to note is that both EU and non-EU migrants working in the UK are a highly diversified group. The two largest blocks (i.e. ‘Rest of the World – 42%’ and ‘Rest of the EU – 33%’) are in fact not blocks but a plethora of different nationalities. Again, this points to the fact that immigrants in the UK are by no means a single ‘unitary’ block but a highly diverse demographic.


The level of education and the average age of migrants are also important measurements to consider. Research conducted by the LSE (see Table 1<sup>5</sup>) has found that EU migrants are almost twice as likely to have some form of higher education than their UK counterparts (43% compared with 23% UK-born).<sup>6</sup> Only 15% of EU migrants in the UK have left school by the age of 16, compared to 44% UK-born.

TABLE 1: EDUCATION AND IMMIGRATION STATUS  
(WORKING AGE POPULATION) 2015

Age finished education	UK-born	EU immigrants	A8 immigrants	All immigrants
High (21 or older)	23%	43%	36%	45%
Medium (17–20)	33%	42%	55%	36%
Low (16 or under)	44%	15%	9%	19%
<b>All</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

FIGURE 5: AGE DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS

Source: Labour Force Survey, Quarter 4 (October–December)



In terms of age, migrants tend to be younger than the native UK population. Figure 5 shows that, as of 2014, 36% of migrants were between the ages of 25 and 35, compared with 24% of the native population. However, data from the youngest group (16- to 24-year-olds) shows that the UK-born outnumber the foreign-born in this age bracket by 15% to 8%. This may suggest that migrants are more likely to come to the UK in their twenties and thirties than any other age bracket.



It is clear that Britain's migrant communities have played and will continue to play a crucial role in helping build modern British society. However, can the economic impact of migration on the national economy be quantified? And if so, what would the likely results be? The answers to these questions will be explored in the remainder of this chapter.

## THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MIGRATION

At a global level, 'most economists would agree that increased migration brings economic gains.'<sup>7</sup> However, research has shown that net migration in the UK has an insignificant impact on the country's GDP per head.<sup>8</sup> Any increase in the standard of living of the country is, at best, negligible. A study led by Dr Robert Rowthorn, Emeritus Professor of Economics at Cambridge University, looked in some detail at the costs and benefits of large-scale immigration in the UK. The study found that:


There is widespread agreement amongst specialists that the overall fiscal impact of large-scale immigration is normally small as a proportion of GDP. The large positive fiscal contribution of some types of immigrant is largely or wholly offset by the negative contribution of others.<sup>9</sup>

So if the impact of immigration on GDP per head is most likely insignificant, what about the overall GDP? A basic understanding of the macroeconomic principles of Aggregate Supply and Aggregate Demand would suggest that, at least in the short term, positive net migration has a positive economic impact on a country's GDP.

Figure 6 illustrates the implications of a positive shock in Aggregate Demand within a national economy. Assume axis 'P' represents the 'price level' (i.e. the average market cost of a product or service), and axis 'y' represents the real GDP (i.e. the total production output of a national economy, adjusted for inflation). Assuming we start at point 'A' on the graph, the Aggregate Demand line (AD – in red) intersects the Aggregate Supply line (AS – in blue), and thus a perfect market equilibrium is reached at Price Level 'P' and output 'Y'.

FIGURE 6: AS – AD MODEL

Source: www.economicsonline.co.uk



Now it is reasonable to assume that a positive net migration flow would slightly push the Aggregate Demand line higher. Therefore the new point of market equilibrium has moved from 'A' to 'B'. This results in a short-term increase in both the Price Level ( $P$  to  $P_1$ ) as well as GDP output (from  $Y$  to  $Y_1$ ). However, in the long run, wage increases gradually close the inflationary gap in the price level ( $P_1 - P_2$ ),

and the Aggregate Supply line moves upward (AS to AS1). Therefore the market equilibrium re-stabilises along the Long-run Aggregate Supply line (LRAS) at point C.

So positive net migration does in turn translate into a positive effect on a national GDP. However, similarly to Rowthorn, the journalist Mark Kleinman argues that the overall effect is likely to be modest at best: 'Gains [from migration] in the UK are likely to be small relative to the size of the [National] economy.'<sup>10</sup> It would therefore be difficult to argue that the average population will feel any positive economic impact in their day-to-day lives.

A widely cited study led by University College London and published in the *Economic Journal* specifically looked at the 'fiscal effects of immigration to the UK'.<sup>11</sup> It found a discrepancy between EEA-migrants and non-EEA migrants, and concluded:

Immigrants from the European Economic Area (EEA) have made a positive fiscal contribution, even during periods when the UK was running budget deficits, while non-EEA immigrants, not dissimilar to natives, have made a negative contribution. For immigrants that arrived since 2000, contributions have been positive throughout, and particularly so for immigrants from EEA countries. Notable is the strong positive contribution made by immigrants from countries that joined the EU in 2004.<sup>12</sup>

Douglas Murray, founder of the Centre for Social Cohesion, wrote extensively on this topic.<sup>13</sup> In his research into the period 1995–2011 he found that only more recent EEA migrants can be considered to have made a ‘significant’ positive fiscal contribution to the UK. According to Murray, migrants from outside the EEA took out approximately £95bn more than they put in – possibly due to remittances.<sup>14</sup>


Similarly, Migration Watch UK points to three major studies that have assessed the net fiscal impact of all migrants in the UK over different periods:<sup>15</sup>

- The OECD found an average annual net fiscal cost of migration of £4.3bn in the years 2007 to 2009.
- Dustmann and Frattini of CReAM found that all migrants were a net fiscal cost of £14.8bn in the financial year 2011/12.
- Research conducted by Migration Watch UK found that all migrants were a net fiscal cost of £13bn in 2014/15.<sup>16</sup>

## MIGRATION AND EMPLOYMENT

What exactly are the life circumstances of migrants once settled in the UK? Figure 7 shows the employment rates between foreign migrants and UK-born. This is further split along gender lines.

FIGURE 7: EMPLOYMENT RATES OF FOREIGN-BORN AND UK-BORN, 1993–2014



Historically speaking, foreign male migrants were far less likely to be in employment than their native counterparts. However, this trend changed in 2010. If, in 1993, 67% of foreign-born males and 76% of UK-born males were in employment, by 2014 79% of foreign-born males were in employment compared to the native male employment rate of 77%. Female employment levels have remained relatively stable throughout this period – albeit on a gradual yet steady upward trend. Despite this, foreign-born females, as of 2014, still have the lowest employment levels at 62%, compared to their UK counterparts at 72%. One reason behind this could be that migrant women are more likely to be stay-at-home parents than their UK counterparts.

In terms of specific employment positions, data from the Migration Observatory (see Table 2)<sup>17</sup> shows that the top industries with foreign-born workers in the UK are food manufacturing (41%), apparel manufacturing (34%) and domestic personnel (31%). While these may be considered low-skilled sectors, migrants also make up a significant portion of more highly skilled industries such as IT and consultancy (26%) and security and

investigations (27%). Foreign migrants also have a strong presence in the healthcare industry: 6,000 out of 33,000 nurses newly recruited by the NHS in 2015–16 were from the EU. Similarly, 20% of all newly recruited speciality doctors were EU nationals.<sup>18</sup>

TABLE 2

	<b>Top 10 by workforce share, all migrants</b>	<b>%</b>
1	Manufacture of food products	41
2	Manufacture of wearing apparel	34
3	Domestic personnel	31
4	Food and beverages service activities	28
5	Accommodation	28
6	Security and investigation activities	27
7	Computer programme and consultancy	26
8	Service to buildings and landscape	26
9	Land transport incl. via pipelines	25
10	Warehousing and support for transport	24

What about the impact of migrants on the prospects and number of UK natives in employment? Research suggests that ‘competition from migrants has damaged the employment of native UK workers, at least during the economic crisis’.<sup>19</sup> This is the broader picture: during times of economic growth or stability there is no significant evidence to suggest that migrants have an adverse effect on the employment levels of native workers. However, in times of recession or economic downturn, there does appear to be a discrepancy between migrant and native levels of employment. For instance, from the beginning of 2008 until early 2010, employment levels among UK natives fell by over 3% (or 700,000). During the same period, employment levels among foreign-born workers remained ‘virtually constant’.<sup>20</sup>

One explanation for this might be that high levels of migration – within a certain area – can result in displacement among native workers. A native who loses his or her job to a migrant can become discouraged and may even

stop seeking employment altogether. A report by the Home Office found that:

there is evidence for some labour market displacement in recent years when the economy was in recession . . . The evidence also suggests that . . . any displacement impacts from one set of new arrivals gradually decline as the labour market adjusts.<sup>21</sup>

So it is reasonable to conclude that when the economy is performing poorly, migration can have an adverse effect on the levels of employment among native workers.

## MIGRATION AND WAGES

Does immigration put pressure on wages, and if so, to what extent? The body of studies that can be found on this topic almost unanimously disagree in their conclusions. However, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that immigration can indeed put downward pressure on wages for the low skilled.

### **‘Immigration can indeed put downward pressure on wages for the low skilled’**

With respect to EU migrants, a report conducted by the Centre for Economic Performance at the LSE claims that ‘There is no evidence that EU migrants affect the labour market performance of native-born workers.’<sup>22</sup> Similarly, another study has found that ‘There is no strong evidence that immigration has any large adverse effects on employment prospects or wages.’<sup>23</sup>

However, on the flipside, organisations such as Migration Watch UK have found that ‘Research points to some negative impact on the wages of the lower paid.’<sup>24</sup> Similarly, a study conducted by the Bank of England in 2015 found that migration caused downward pressure on average wages. The largest effect was observed in the semi/unskilled services sector, where the report found that ‘The coefficients indicate that a 10-percentage point rise in the proportion of immigrants working in semi/unskilled services – that is, in care homes, bars, shops, restaurants, cleaning, for example – leads to a 1.88 percent reduction in pay.’<sup>25</sup> Therefore immigration reduces the wages of

those already in low-wage jobs. Also, the floor of the minimum wage is likely to promote further employment across industries at minimum wages levels.

The body of research from both sides of the argument points to the idea that while there is no evidence to suggest that immigration has a negative effect on wages for high-skilled workers, it can have a negative effect on low-skilled workers. Professor Jonathan Portes from the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) said that ‘The research confirms what we already thought. Immigration may have some, small, negative impact on wages for some low-paid workers.’<sup>26</sup> Similarly, Rowthorn has found that ‘competition from immigrants may result in lower wages for low-skilled local workers, including previous immigrants.’<sup>27</sup>

The extent of the negative effect remains to be seen. The Bank of England report found a 1.88% reduction in pay, but this is by no means conclusive. A key issue is what happens more generally to economic welfare. So the first point to make is that if – for argument’s sake – migrants are relatively unskilled, they will reduce measured productivity and GDP per head. Note here that the emphasis is on GDP per head rather than cumulative, real GDP (i.e. GDP adjusted to inflation). Paradoxically, the reduction in GDP per head can happen despite the wages of both the migrant and the indigenous population rising.

For example, let’s say the average wage in Poland is £600 and the average wage in Britain is £1,500. A Polish migrant who previously earned £400 comes to Britain and earns £1,300. Three measurements are affected by this change: first, the migrant has a tiny upward effect on UK productivity (due to skills complementarities); second, the average wage in Poland rises (insignificantly, however); third, the average wage in the UK falls (yet again, insignificantly).

So the relevant questions are:


1. What happens to the welfare of the migrant? The answer is that it clearly increases.
2. What happens to the average wages of the indigenous population as a whole – including highly and low-skilled workers? The answer is that there is most likely no measurable change for the former though there can be a slight negative change for the latter.

## MIGRATION AND HOUSING

The impact of migration on the UK housing market is also more complex than one might think. It is easy to assume that an increased demand from migrants would put pressure on a limited UK housing supply, yet the problem has far more variables that must be considered.

Article 25 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights recognises housing as a crucial component of an individual's right to a 'standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family'.<sup>28</sup> It comes as no surprise, then, that housing represents the largest investment asset in the UK, with households holding more than £4.43 trillion in private property.<sup>29</sup> Yet despite this, home ownership in the UK has actually fallen from 69% to 63% in the past decade.<sup>30</sup> One of the reasons behind this change can be attributed to the steadfast rise in house prices across the UK. Figure 8 shows the average price of a house in the UK (adjusted to inflation) from 1975 to 2015. What becomes apparent is that although cyclical in nature, house prices follow an overall upward trend. If the average price of a house, adjusted for inflation, was £80,000 in 1975, by 2015 it had more than doubled, to almost £200,000.

FIGURE 8: REAL HOUSE PRICES





A report published by the *National Institute Economic Review* points to several core issues with the housing market in the UK:

- An increasing number of houses are being bought for investment purposes, which raises the cost of housing.
- Older generations appear to be ‘under occupying’ and even hoarding houses, while younger generations are struggling to move into homes.
- The number of new homes continues to fall below the number of new families.
- The reclassification of housing associations may reduce this essential source of housing for lower-income families less able to access long-term stable funding.<sup>31</sup>

While a detailed analysis of the UK’s housing market will have to be left for another time, at the crux of the issue lies a restrictive supply of new houses that consistently fails to meet demand. Under the UK’s ‘planning system’, significant power is given to local councils in deciding the allocated place, size and number of new houses to be built. Migration Watch UK estimates that to meet demand, 300,000 new homes will have to be built every year – yet the average over the past decade was 170,000.<sup>32</sup> The problem is that although governments from both sides of the political divide have pledged major reform, so much wealth is allocated in housing stock that the demand to maintain the status quo trumps the will for reform.

So does immigration place inflationary pressures on the housing market? The answer to this question is affirmative, but only in the slightest.

Research conducted by Professor Filipa Sá of King’s College London has found that immigration can actually lower house prices in certain areas.<sup>33</sup> Central to the evidence she presents is the idea that ‘natives respond to immigration by moving to different areas and those who leave are at the top of the wage distribution. This generates a negative income effect on housing demand and pushes down house prices.’<sup>34</sup>

However, this is only part of the story. While migrants moving into a certain area may drive down house prices, residents moving out of that area may in turn increase demand and drive house prices higher in the new areas to which they decide to relocate. A report published by the Migration Observatory concluded that:

evidence on the impacts of migration on house prices in the UK remains inconclusive . . . while migration may be associated with house price decreases at the local level, out-migration of UK nationals to other areas could mean that migration increases house prices, on average, across the UK as a whole.<sup>35</sup>

So while migration may increase house prices at a national level, the exact extent of the housing price increase that can be directly attributed to migration remains difficult to determine. The Communities Secretary, Sajid Javid, was recently questioned in a parliamentary debate about the pressures of immigration on the housing market, to which he responded:

I have looked at this carefully and I am not sure it actually makes the kind of difference that you believe. Two-thirds of housing demand has got nothing to do with immigration, it's to do with natural population growth, in particular people living longer, and that will be something that has to be catered for regardless. And even if immigration was to fall to zero, for example, we would still have a deficit of homes of some two million and people would still be in over-crowded homes, so we still have to keep building.<sup>36</sup>

Based on what has been seen thus far, the housing market in the UK appears to have deeper structural difficulties that go beyond issues of migration. However, if taken holistically, the research suggests that migration can play a role in increasing average house prices – yet the exact extent of this requires further investigation.

## MIGRATION AND PUBLIC SERVICES


Discovering the exact impact of migration on public services poses similar challenges to that of migration and housing. Like housing, the available data and research commissioned on migration and public services is, at best, limited in depth and certainty. Yet it is not necessarily the fault of the institutional bodies or the researchers themselves, rather the difficulty lies in accurately measuring and quantifying the data.

Nonetheless, there are several points that can be made with relative certainty. First, there is an important distinction to be made between general pressure on public services caused by organic demand and/or budgetary cuts, and pressure specifically attributed to immigration.

**‘Migration can play a role in increasing average house prices’**

Second, research conducted by the Migration Observatory has shown that the implications of migration for public services are highly dependent on the area in question. As shown in Figure 9, the Office for National Statistics estimated in 2013 that 36% of the population in London was born abroad compared to just 5% in the North East.<sup>37</sup>

FIGURE 9: PROPORTION OF UK POPULATION BORN ABROAD BY REGION



Third, research conducted by the LSE has shown that:

because immigrants are on average younger and in work, they tend to demand and use fewer public services and they are more likely to contribute tax revenue . . . For example, East European immigrants paid in about £15 billion more than they took out in public spending and benefits in the decade up to 2011.<sup>38</sup>

However, there are concerns associated with a rapid increase in the migrant population within areas where public services are already under considerable strain. Further research has shown that although migrants tend to be younger and healthier than the average resident population, they may require less use of healthcare or social care but an increased use of public education and maternity care.<sup>39</sup> Migration Watch UK points out that although migrants are younger, they will inevitably age and place the same pressures on the NHS as the resident population.<sup>40</sup>

In terms of public transport, a report published by the Migration Advisory Committee found that migrants are ‘likely to generate more congestion than the average UK-born individual, reflecting the fact that they are more likely to be employed and more likely to work in London’.<sup>41</sup>

So the overall body of research on the impact of immigration on public services remains patchy. However, it is reasonable to conclude that rapid increases in the immigrant population may cause systemic problems – especially in areas where there is already a great amount of strain on public services.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Office for National Statistics, 2018; [www.ons.gov.uk](http://www.ons.gov.uk).

<sup>2</sup> Cumulative figure of net migration to the UK (2000–15).

<sup>3</sup> Asa Benett, 'Theresa May's Devotion to David Cameron's Net Migration Target is a High-Risk Gamble', *The Telegraph*, 4 October 2016; [www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/04/theresa-mays-devotion-to-david-camerons-net-migration-target-is](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/04/theresa-mays-devotion-to-david-camerons-net-migration-target-is).

<sup>4</sup> Jonathan Wadsworth, Swati Dhingra, Gianmarco Ottaviano and John Van Reenen, 'Brexit and the Impact of Immigration on the UK', LSE Centre for Economic Performance, May 2017; <http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit05.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> 'A8' migrants include: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.

<sup>6</sup> Wadsworth et al., *ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>7</sup> Mark Kleinman, 'The Economic Impact of Labour Migration', in Sarah Spencer, *The Politics of Migration: Managing Opportunity, Conflict and Change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), p. 61.

<sup>8</sup> Robert Rowthorn, *The Costs and Benefits of Large-Scale Immigration: Exploring the Economic and Demographic Consequences for the UK* (London: Civitas, 2015), p. 25; [www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/largescaleimmigration.pdf](http://www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/largescaleimmigration.pdf).

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 68.

<sup>10</sup> Kleinman, *ibid.*, p. 62.

<sup>11</sup> Christian Dustmann and Tommaso Frattini, 'The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK', *The Economic Journal* 124:580 (2014), pp. 593–643.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> Douglas Murray, *The Strange Death of Europe: Immigration, Identity, Islam* (London: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2017), p. 42.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42.

<sup>15</sup> Migration Watch, 'Are Migrants an Economic Benefit to the UK?', 20 June 2016; [www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/386](http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/386).

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> The Migration Observatory, 'Briefing: Migrants in the UK Labour Market: An Overview', 1 December 2016; [www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Briefing-Migrants\\_UK\\_Labour\\_Market.pdf](http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Briefing-Migrants_UK_Labour_Market.pdf).

<sup>18</sup> Nicole Morley, 'NHS would Collapse without Foreign Workers, warn Leading Nurses', 7 October 2016; <http://metro.co.uk/2016/10/07/nhs-would-collapse-without-foreign-workers-warn-leading-nurses-6177003>.

<sup>19</sup> Rowthorn, *ibid.*, p. 24.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28.

<sup>22</sup> Wadsworth et al., *ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>23</sup> Kleinman, *ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>24</sup> Migration Watch UK, 'Employment and Welfare', 18 December 2017; [www.migrationwatchuk.org/key-topics/employment-welfare](http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/key-topics/employment-welfare).

<sup>25</sup> Stephen Nickell and Jumana Saleheen, 'The Impact of Immigration on Occupational Wages: Evidence from Britain', Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 574, December 2015; [www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/workingpapers/2015/swp574.pdf](http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/workingpapers/2015/swp574.pdf).

<sup>26</sup> Jonathan Portes, 'How Small is Small? The Impact of Immigration on UK Wages'; [www.niesr.ac.uk/blog/how-small-small-impact-immigration-uk-wages#.WJoawhmLRhE](http://www.niesr.ac.uk/blog/how-small-small-impact-immigration-uk-wages#.WJoawhmLRhE).

<sup>27</sup> Rowthorn, *ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>28</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights'; [www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR\\_Translations/eng.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf).

<sup>29</sup> Angus Armstrong, 'Commentary: UK Housing Market: Problems and Policies', *National Institute Economic Review* 235:1 (2016), pp. 5–8; <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/002795011623500103>.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> Migration Watch UK, 'Housing', 19 January 2018; [www.migrationwatchuk.org/key-topics/housing](http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/key-topics/housing).

<sup>33</sup> Filipa Sá, 'Immigration and House Prices in the UK', *The Economic Journal* 125:587 (2015), pp. 1393–1424.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> The Migration Observatory, 'Briefing: Migrants and Housing in the UK: Experiences and Impacts', 28 October 2016; [www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Briefing-Migrant\\_Housing.pdf](http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Briefing-Migrant_Housing.pdf).

<sup>36</sup> *Business Reporter*, 'Sajid Javid: Immigration not to blame for Housing Crisis', 8 February 2017; <https://business-reporter.co.uk/2017/02/08/sajid-javid-immigration-not-blame-housing-crisis>.

<sup>37</sup> The Migration Observatory, 'Election 2015 Briefing: Impacts of Migration on Local Public Services', 6 May 2015; [www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/election-2015-briefing-impacts-of-migration-on-local-public-services](http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/election-2015-briefing-impacts-of-migration-on-local-public-services).

<sup>38</sup> Swati Dhingra, Gianmarco Ottaviano, John Van Reenen and Jonathan Wadsworth, 'Why Immigration is no Reason to Leave the EU', *CentrePiece* 21:1 (2016), pp. 10–13; <http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/cp471.pdf>.

<sup>39</sup> The Migration Observatory, 'Election 2015 Briefing', *ibid*.

<sup>40</sup> Migration Watch UK, 'Public Services and Infrastructure', 18 December 2017; [www.migrationwatchuk.org/key-topics/public-services-infrastructure](http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/key-topics/public-services-infrastructure).

<sup>41</sup> Migration Advisory Committee, *Analysis of the Impacts of Migration* (London: Migration Advisory Committee, 2012), p. 77; [www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/257235/analysis-of-the-impacts.pdf](http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/257235/analysis-of-the-impacts.pdf).





## CHAPTER 4

---

# CHRISTIANITY, THE CHURCH AND MIGRATION

Before opening this chapter, it is important to make the distinction between legal migrants – including asylum seekers and refugees – and illegal migrants. As seen in Chapters 1 to 3, this study is almost exclusively focused on legal immigration to the UK. Therefore the evaluation of Christian teaching and the response of the Church throughout this chapter is in relation to legal immigration. More specifically, the aim is to understand what a Christian approach would look like in tackling legal migrants fleeing persecution (i.e. refugees and asylum seekers). Although some principles that arise could be equally applied to illegal immigration, a thorough study in that direction will have to be left for another occasion. In considering the topic of migration from a Christian theological framework, the first part of the chapter will perform an exegetical analysis on the biblical texts themselves, while the second part will seek to understand the more ‘practical’ responses of the Church in relation to the issue of migration within the UK.

## THE PARABLE OF THE GOOD SAMARITAN

Does the Bible have anything to say about immigration? And if so, what would a Christian attitude towards immigration look like? What would the core, underlying principles be?

While biblical texts may not make direct references to immigration, there are certainly strong references to one’s attitude towards the ‘other’, the different. Indeed, the command to ‘Love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your strength, and with all your mind; and your neighbour as yourself’ (Luke 10.27) sits at the heart of biblical teaching. References to ‘neighbourly love’ and treating others as you would like to be treated are found throughout both the Old and New Testaments (Luke 6.31; 10.27; Mark 12.30–31; Matthew 7.12; 22.37; Leviticus 19.9–18; Galatians 5.14). This is the ‘golden rule’. However, of all Jesus’ teachings, the parable of the Good Samaritan found in Luke 10.25–37 is arguably the most overt passage in exposing the extent and the true meaning of ‘loving your neighbour’. The aim here is to perform an analysis on this parable.

The Gospels of the New Testament represent the foremost historical account of Jesus Christ, each providing a distinctive yet equally valuable perspective on the works and life of Jesus. Alongside Matthew and Mark, the Gospel of Luke is assumed to have been written around AD 70–80 by Luke the Evangelist, a companion to the Apostle Paul.<sup>1</sup> As the second-longest of the four Gospels, Luke represents a major pillar of New Testament teaching. One of the main purposes of the Gospel itself is to provide an accurate record of the events that have happened. Or as the author himself notes in 1.3: ‘I too decided, after investigating everything carefully from the very first, to write an orderly account for you, most excellent Theophilus.’ Yet it would be a mistake to assume that Luke is just a historical, orderly account of the life and teachings of Jesus. It is, indeed, an encouragement in faith infused with the theology of ‘salvation history’. Allan Wesley points out that central to Luke’s writing is the motif that God’s past, present and future purposes can be revealed in the way he acts throughout history.<sup>2</sup> Luke therefore is not only intended to provide a historical narrative, answering the question ‘Did it happen?’ but rather ‘What does it all mean?’<sup>3</sup> As John Drane argues, ‘[Luke] writes so that his readers may know the full implications of the Christian message.’<sup>4</sup> It is also worth pointing out that Luke is the ‘universal Gospel’, aimed at the Gentiles, in distinction from Matthew, which is often seen as the ‘Jewish Gospel’.

## **‘What would a Christian attitude towards immigration look like?’**

Luke 1.3 also gives us a clue to the Gospel’s intended audience: ‘for you, most excellent Theophilus’. In Greek the term ‘Theophilus’ – *Θεόφιλος* – means ‘Friend of God’ or ‘Lover of God’.<sup>5</sup> From this it can be deduced that Luke’s intended audience could be an individual or a group of people sympathetic to God, most probably young Christians.

The contextual narrative of Luke 10 is Jesus’ long journey from the start of his ministry in Galilee to Jerusalem. More specifically, Luke 10.17–24 is a moment of deep rejoicing for Jesus because the seventy who were sent returned with ‘great’ power over demons and evil spirits in his name.

It is within this context that the parable of the Good Samaritan begins. A ‘certain lawyer’ stands up and asks, ‘Teacher, what must I do to inherit

eternal life?’ (Luke 10.25). Far more than it is in the West today, the question of eternal life and life after death was a central preoccupation for the people of ancient Judea. The lawyer’s question had no amicable intent; it was set out to test Jesus in seeing what kind of answer he would produce. It is important to notice how the lawyer’s question also focuses on human efforts – ‘What must I do?’ – which may suggest a lack of knowledge of salvation by divine grace and a belief in salvation by works.<sup>6</sup>

In verse 26 Jesus characteristically answers the lawyer’s question with another question, ‘What is written in the law?’, to which the lawyer responds in verse 27, as quoted above. His response is strikingly similar to the answer Jesus gave when asked about the greatest commandment (Mark 12.30). It is possible that the lawyer heard Jesus’ teaching on previous occasions or has a thorough understanding of the Old Testament Law – or both. It is reasonable to assume that within this context the term ‘lawyer’ does not refer to a lawyer in a secular sense, but a ‘lawyer’ of religious law. Regardless, the answer Jesus gives back is a crucial point in the analysis. It creates the – rather unexpected – foundation that enables him to tell the parable of the Good Samaritan.

In verse 28 Jesus affirmatively commends the lawyer: ‘You have given the right answer; do this, and you will live.’ It would be a mistake to treat this answer at face value. What Jesus is really doing is allowing the lawyer to believe he can fulfil the commandment through his own strength, with the implication that he will fail, thus realising that salvation does not come through one’s own strength or following a set of rules. As Leon Morris argues:

If you want a way of salvation by doing, this is it (with the implication that you won’t be able to do it) . . . If we really love God in the way of which Jesus speaks, then we rely on him, not ourselves.<sup>7</sup>

The lawyer tries to validate his questioning by going even further and asking: ‘And who is my neighbour?’ (10.29). He must have understood that this

extends beyond his immediate vicinity, but how far does it really extend? A likely possibility would be within the tribes of Israel.

It is in answer to this question that Jesus begins telling the parable. The story is well known: narrated in Luke 10.30–35, Jesus tells a story of a man who on his journey from Jerusalem to Jericho was robbed, beaten and left ‘half dead’ on the side of the road. Two prominent authorities within the Jewish community, a priest and a Levite, pass by and deliberately avoid the wounded man by choosing to pass on the other side of the road. The third man, a Samaritan, is the one who stops and cares for the wounded man.

**‘It was the Samaritan who showed compassion’**

Although not mentioned explicitly, we can assume that given the context, the wounded man was of Jewish origin.<sup>8</sup> Nonetheless, the more striking point of the parable is that two Jewish priestly figures, perceived by the community to be highly righteous in themselves and in their relationship with God, deliberately disobey the core commandment of the Law (Luke 10.27).

The man who did, however, show true love came from the most unexpected of places. Within the historical context there was great antagonism between the Jews and Samaritans. Scholars such as John Drane argue that pious Jews despised the Samaritans more than any other race.<sup>9</sup> Yet it was the Samaritan who showed compassion and cared for the wounded man. In Luke 10.34–35 the Samaritan provides first aid and takes the man to an inn, where he covers the cost of his treatment.

In the final verses of the parable (Luke 10.36–37), Jesus transforms the lawyer’s question from ‘Who is my neighbour?’ to ‘Who behaves like a neighbour?’ The lawyer responded without even mentioning the word ‘Samaritan’, rather ‘The one who showed . . . mercy.’ Jesus ends the discussion, in verse 37, with a clear command: ‘Go and do likewise.’ This probably made the lawyer and some in the audience rather uncomfortable.

What are some of the main lessons that can be drawn from this? First, true love looks like compassion for others, especially for those in need. The

main question here is not ‘Who is my neighbour?’ but rather ‘To whom am I a neighbour?’<sup>10</sup> The fundamental initiative and change comes from within. Jesus warned about this in Matthew 15.18: ‘But what comes out of the mouth proceeds from the heart, and this is what defiles’ – true love for one’s neighbour flows from within. Second, the ability to show compassion is not dependent on any race, gender or ethnic background. Luke perhaps intentionally emphasised this message through the lawyer’s answer as the ‘one who showed mercy’ rather than simply ‘the Samaritan’. Third, a false sense of self-righteousness and an over-reliance on the religious system can be immensely detrimental to one’s capacity to show compassion.

The Old Testament also has a fair amount to say about migrants or ‘welcoming the stranger’. Perhaps the richest source in this respect is Deuteronomy 10.12–22. Here Moses talks about the essence of the Law and what it should mean to Israel in practical terms. His first step in this direction is to begin with asking the Israelites a rhetorical question to which he immediately provides the answer:

... what does the LORD your God require of you? Only to fear the LORD your God, to walk in all his ways, to love him, to serve the LORD your God with all your heart and with all your soul, and to keep the commandments of the LORD your God and his decrees that I am commanding you today, for your own well-being. (Deuteronomy 10.12–13)

As we have seen in the parable of the Good Samaritan, the greatest commandment was indeed echoed over a thousand years later by the lawyer in his answer to Jesus (Luke 10.27). Yet the emphasis Moses makes here is as much on the commandment itself as on the beneficiaries. It is not for the good of God that they should fear and love God but for their own good.

Moses justifies this in verses 14–15 by stressing the immeasurable power and might of God but also his righteousness in showing favour to those who obey him – in this case the forefathers of Israel and their descendants.

From Deuteronomy 10.16 onwards, Moses shifts the focus to how the Israelites ought to become, and conduct themselves, in light of this supreme

privilege. ‘Circumcise, then, the foreskin of your heart, and do not be stubborn any longer’, reads verse 16. Rightly, J. A. Thompson argues that the metaphor of a heart circumcision draws clear parallels to the physical act itself. It fundamentally represents an act of opening up:

the circumcised heart becomes open, and, being freed from hindering obstructions, it can become pliable and amenable to the direction of God. The result of such a circumcision will be submission to the will of God and the end of stubbornness.<sup>11</sup>

The crux of Moses’ message comes in verses 17–19. Why should Israel do all this? Why should they ‘circumcise’ their hearts? First, because the Lord is supremely powerful above all existence; second, because righteousness is the core characteristic of his very nature; and third, because he therefore cares about injustice and ‘loves the strangers’ (10.18). It is because of his righteousness that Israel should ‘fear’ or show deep reverence to God. Moses therefore urges the Israelites to ‘love the stranger’ (10.19). They are not only called to love the stranger because God loves the stranger, but also because they were once strangers in the land of Egypt (10.19).

**‘Jesus embodies  
what true love  
really looks like’**

Within the Old Testament context it is precisely because God loves the stranger and the marginalised that Moses is calling Israel also to love the stranger and the marginalised. Because of God’s love for them, the covenant people of Israel are called to do likewise. Moreover, Raymond Brown argues that this love ‘will never be merely vocal; it [must] be strenuously and sacrificially practical. It [must] be a love that costs something, like God’s love which was not without price.’<sup>12</sup> A key issue facing Israel at the time of Moses was how to balance love for vulnerable people, in the light of their own suffering and oppression, with the need to uphold a distinct identity in terms of their covenant relationship with God.<sup>13</sup>

Both the Old and New Testaments call for a love that goes beyond thoughts or feelings and is developed into character and action. 1 John 3.18 calls all followers of Jesus Christ to love ‘not in word or speech, but in truth and

action'. If Moses in Deuteronomy takes a more theological angle on love, Jesus practically exemplifies and embodies what true love really looks like.

## MIGRATION AND THE CHURCH

As mentioned previously, it is important to make the distinction between legal migrants – including asylum seekers and refugees – and illegal migrants. Refugees in this case are mostly legal migrants who have fled conflict in their countries of origin. Of course, there may be refugees who flee to Europe for other reasons (economic or social), but by and large the focus here is on those fleeing military conflict and its associated consequences. There is also a distinction to be drawn between economic migrants (to which the parable of the Good Samaritan does not necessarily apply) and refugees fleeing persecution (to which it does).

So we have seen through the parable of the Good Samaritan that Christians are called to show care and compassion, especially for those most vulnerable. Indeed, there is a common thread throughout both the Old and New Testaments of caring for the stranger and showing practical love.<sup>14</sup> Yet can this Christian teaching be translated into public policy? If so, what would it look like? A useful case to look at would be the Church's response to the refugee crisis in Europe.

Despite its tumultuous history, the Church in the UK has established itself as a leading force in tackling social issues of public concern and community life. From poverty alleviation to multi-disciplinary training, it has unrivalled depth and reach in local communities across the UK – particularly the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church.

This is not the first time the Church of England has been faced with a refugee crisis. Perhaps the most famous refugees were the French Huguenots of the sixteenth century. The Protestant Reformation reverberated throughout Europe and, in effect, forced the French Protestants – known as Huguenots – to flee Catholic persecution in France. Over 50,000 found refuge in Britain under the reign of Edward VI,<sup>15</sup> and in 1550 established the first French Protestant church in Soho.<sup>16</sup>



Indeed, the Church has been vocal in welcoming refugees and caring for those who flee conflict. In a Bishops' report of the Catholic Church of England and Wales, the Chairman, Patrick Lynch, concluded:

As Disciples of Christ we are blessed with the gift of knowing God's love, as missionaries for Christ we are charged with the task of being instruments and witness to that love. We will stand in solidarity with our migrant brothers and sisters and all those in our Church assisting them and we will continue to advocate just and fair, managed migration policies.<sup>17</sup>

In his latest Encyclical, *Laudato Si'*, Pope Francis calls on people to act as inheritors of God's creation and to 'share its fruits, especially with the poor, with widows, orphans and foreigners'.<sup>18</sup> Catholic social teaching on immigration is rooted in three main principles: first, people have the right to migrate to sustain their lives and the lives of their families; second, a country has the right to regulate its borders and control immigration; third, a country must regulate its borders with justice and mercy.<sup>19</sup>

Angela Merkel's commitment to accept one million refugees in 2015 can be seen as a case of good intentions – Christian or otherwise – that have resoundingly backfired. In the German federal elections of 2017, Merkel's Christian Democratic Union had its worst electoral performance since 1949, effectively marking the beginning of the end of her political standing as global leader. She also fuelled Germany's far-right, which thrived on nationalistic and anti-immigration rhetoric: the right-wing Alternative for Germany went from seven seats in the Bundestag in 2014 to ninety-four in 2017, making it the third-largest party in Germany. Rather unsurprisingly, Merkel was effectively forced to backpedal on her immigration policy. In a recent interview she said that 'Integration requires well-defined underlying values and clear and noticeable consequences for those who refuse [it]<sup>20</sup> – too little too late? In a similar fashion, the Italian elections of 2018 witnessed the meteoric rise Luigi Di Maio's anti-establishment Five Star Movement.<sup>21</sup>

Justin Welby, the current Archbishop of Canterbury, saw the British government's commitment to resettle 20,000 refugees as a 'slim' effort, especially in comparison to Germany's commitment to resettle over one million refugees.<sup>22</sup> However, the response from individual churches and Christian NGOs has been far more diverse. The Churches Together in Britain and Ireland (CTBI) compiled a collection of responses to the refugee crisis.<sup>23</sup> The overwhelming majority are a call to aid and care for the most vulnerable, but the extent of this 'aid' differs. It does seem that the Church's responses are as varied as the churches themselves.

Here lies the difficulty of turning a Samaritan ethos into public policy: biblical teaching was probably never intended to act as an agent of public policy development. This is where the difficulty of drawing a 'Christian' response lies. How much is 20,000 really? Should it be 20,000, 200,000 or two million? In Jesus' story, the Good Samaritan generously cared for the wounded man

**'Christian teaching  
calls on people  
to act from a  
foundation of love'**

and paid for his rehabilitation (Luke 10.34–35) – he did not bring him back to his home or local town. Indeed, there are verses in the Bible in which Jesus encourages prudence and careful planning in avoiding situations that can become unsustainable. In Luke 14.25–33,

just a few chapters along from the parable of the Good Samaritan, Jesus talks about the true cost of following him. He uses the example of building a tower, whereby the builder must first sit and carefully estimate the resources needed to finish the project (Luke 14.28–30). Similarly, he talks about a king with an army of ten thousand men considering whether it is wise to join battle with another king who has an army of twenty thousand (Luke 14.32).

What is clear, however, is that Christian teaching calls on people to act from a foundation of love and compassion for others. It is meant to inspire and transform on a spiritual and personal level. Therefore the fine balance lies in caring for the most vulnerable refugees, but caring in a manner that is ethical and sustainable for all parties involved – both the host population and the refugees themselves.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Pheme Perkins, *Introduction to the Synoptic Gospels* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), pp. 250–3.

<sup>2</sup> O. Wesley Allen, Jr, 'Luke', in Gail R. O'Day and David L. Petersen (eds), *Theological Bible Commentary* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009), p. 326.

<sup>3</sup> Joel B. Green, *The Gospel of Luke*, New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997), p. 36.

<sup>4</sup> John Drane, *Introducing the New Testament*, 3rd edn (Oxford: Lion Hudson, 2010), p. 161.

<sup>5</sup> Blue Letter Bible, 'Theophilus', 2017; [www.blueletterbible.org/lang/lexicon/lexicon.cfm?Strong=G2321&Version=KJV](http://www.blueletterbible.org/lang/lexicon/lexicon.cfm?Strong=G2321&Version=KJV).

<sup>6</sup> Leon Morris, *The Gospel According to Luke: An Introduction and Commentary* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1974), p. 205.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 206.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> Drane, *ibid.*, p. 228.

<sup>10</sup> Morris, *ibid.*, p. 208.

<sup>11</sup> J. A. Thompson, *The Book of Jeremiah*, The New International Commentary on the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1980), p. 150.

<sup>12</sup> Raymond Brown, *The Message of Deuteronomy: Not by Bread Alone* (Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 1993), p. 140.

<sup>13</sup> Jonathan Burnside, *The Status and Welfare of Immigrants* (Cambridge: Jubilee Centre, 2001).

<sup>14</sup> E.g. Deuteronomy 10.19; Leviticus 19.34; Romans 12.13; 13.8, 10; Hebrews 13.1; Colossians 3.11; Matthew 25.35, 40.

<sup>15</sup> The Huguenot Society, 'Huguenot History', 2017; [www.huguenotsociety.org.uk/history.html](http://www.huguenotsociety.org.uk/history.html).

<sup>16</sup> The French Protestant Church in London; [www.egliseprotestantelondres.org.uk](http://www.egliseprotestantelondres.org.uk).

<sup>17</sup> The Catholic Church for England and Wales, 'Mission of The Church to Migrants in England and Wales', April 2008.

<sup>18</sup> Pope Francis, *Laudato Si': On Care for Our Common Home*; [http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco\\_20150524\\_enciclica-laudato-si.html](http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html), §71.

<sup>19</sup> United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 'Catholic Social Teaching on Immigration and the Movement of Peoples', 2017; [www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/immigration/catholic-teaching-on-immigration-and-the-movement-of-peoples.cfm](http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/immigration/catholic-teaching-on-immigration-and-the-movement-of-peoples.cfm).

<sup>20</sup> Roger Boyes, 'It will be Merkel's Fault if the EU falls Apart', *The Times*, 28 February 2018; [www.thetimes.co.uk/article/it-will-be-merkel-s-fault-if-the-eu-falls-apart-9gsljn9lx](http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/it-will-be-merkel-s-fault-if-the-eu-falls-apart-9gsljn9lx).

<sup>21</sup> Francesco Zaffarano, 'The Five Star Movement: How a Comedian's Non-Party became Italy's Biggest Political Force', *New Statesman*, 5 March 2018; [www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2018/03/italy-election-five-star-movement-comedian-beppe-grillo](http://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2018/03/italy-election-five-star-movement-comedian-beppe-grillo).

<sup>22</sup> Daniel Bond, 'Justin Welby: "The EU Debate is Not all About Us. It's About our Vision for the World."', *Politics Home*, 10 March 2016; [www.politicshome.com/news/uk/home-affairs/house/72877/justin-welby-eu-debate-not-all-about-us-its-about-our-vision-world](http://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/home-affairs/house/72877/justin-welby-eu-debate-not-all-about-us-its-about-our-vision-world).

<sup>23</sup> CTBI, 'Churches Respond to the Refugee Crisis', 12 April 2018; <https://ctbi.org.uk/how-the-churches-are-responding-to-the-refugee-crisis>.

# CHAPTER 5

---

## CONCLUSIONS

## FUTURE IMMIGRATION POLICY MUST WORK TOWARDS PRESERVING THE FABRIC OF SOCIETY

Based on what has been said throughout the above, our overarching conclusion is this: national governments have a duty to preserve the fabric of society for the long term. Despite the unquestionable advances and pressures of globalisation, nation states remain the ultimate form of political organisation and authority. National governments have first and foremost the duty to ensure the long-term security and well-being of their people. This includes the political, social, economic and religious dimensions.

These factors are critical in the development of a national policy framework on immigration. They are overarching principles that must be taken into account regardless of political colour or doctrinal inclinations.

A key theme during the era of the early twentieth-century American President Woodrow Wilson was the importance of a nation's ability – and right – to self-determination.<sup>1</sup> Whether in domestic or foreign policy, national governments must have the ultimate say. If they don't or can't, their legitimacy comes under threat – this includes national policy on migration. As Peter Hitchens recently wrote: 'if you want to have a country, you have to decide who can come into it. If you don't, won't, or can't, it's not a proper country.'<sup>2</sup>

Of course, we are living in times when decision-making is increasingly decided at a supranational level. The impact of globalisation is undeniable, and the technological revolution that powers a significant part of it has accelerated global interconnectedness on an unprecedented scale.

Yet the point here is not to deny the international dimension, rather to recognise the sovereignty of the national dimension. We are faced with a dilemma. While Secretary of Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Peter Varghese summarised it very well when he said that 'The great paradox of our time is that we live in a globalised and ever-connected world, yet we guard our sovereignty zealously.'<sup>3</sup>

We have seen above how migration is fundamentally part of Britain's post-war history. From 1945 to the present day, immigration has had deep effects on the dynamics between social pressures and economic incentives, international events and governmental responses. The devastating infrastructural and social consequences of the Second World War changed Britain and the European continent for ever.

The historical record has shown how Britain's legislation dithered from an open-door policy with the Commonwealth that ended with the Immigration Act 1971, to membership of the European Communities (now the European Union) in the 1975 referendum.

Throughout the early 1970s Britain found itself at a political crossroads, split between closer ties with the European continent and increasingly

**'It is vital to maintain  
a long-term vision for  
British society'**

restrictive immigration policy towards the Commonwealth. With Britain's vote in 2016 to leave the EU, the country is yet again faced with an opportunity to redefine the national policy on immigration.

Regardless of what specific form this may take, the future framework of immigration policy will have to do two things. First, it will have to protect and preserve the fabric of society for the long term (i.e. new migrants should be selected based on the likelihood of their successful integration and adherence to British values and culture). Second, it will have to ensure that the decision-making power on immigration remains within the hands of the British government. In other words, policy should be guided along a principle of suitability, and the government should avoid international treaties or agreements that would compromise its decision-making power in this respect.

It is vital to maintain a long-term vision for British society. Policy-makers should really ask themselves a few fundamental questions:

- How likely is it that migrants from country 'x' or 'y' will successfully integrate into British society?

- Will they adhere to the five (official) British values of democracy, rule of law, individual liberty, mutual respect, and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs?
- What is the likely impact that this community will have ten, twenty or thirty years from now?

Of course, a good deal of this is easier said than done – inevitably there will be situations in which it is difficult to predict the likely impact of a certain group of migrants. Yet Britain – and the West more generally – does have a rather powerful policy-making tool: almost a century of immigration experience and over half a century of large-scale immigration experience.

As we saw in Chapter 1, the historical record means that Britain benefits from a wealth of experience on immigration and drafting immigration policy. It would be foolish and irresponsible for a post-Brexit Britain to repeat the same mistakes of the past. We now know that in the long run, growing divisions along religious lines can lead to dangerous levels of alienation and tension for both the migrant community as well as the ‘host’ society. To build a unified society there needs to be a minimal level of assimilation between ethnic and religious groups. Without a set level of cohesion, any nation state runs the risk of creating a dysfunctional society – one that could eventually lead to violence or even severe cases of social unrest.

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS CAN HELP IN SHAPING IMMIGRATION POLICY

Economic indicators can help in shaping immigration policy – but the end result must always be further social cohesion and national solidarity. From an economic perspective we have seen statistics that point to both positive and negative estimates of the impact of net migration on the national economy. For instance, the findings in Chapter 3 have shown that, on average, migrants are younger and healthier than the native born. Migrants from the EU have higher educational qualifications than the UK average, and male migrants are more likely to be in employment than their UK counterparts. Migrants can also provide a supply of labour in industries with shortages, such as manufacturing, construction and the NHS.



However, the findings in Chapter 3 also point to the negative impact of net migration on the British economy: research conducted by Migration Watch UK has found that migration can place downward pressure on wages for the low-skilled sector. On the whole, migration is likely to contribute to the increase in house prices across the UK, particularly in densely populated areas. The overall net impact on the UK's GDP is negligible. Pressure on public services is heavily dependent on the region in question, and areas where public services are already stretched can be negatively affected by rapid increases in immigration – in schooling or public transport, for instance. A study by the economist Robert Rowthorn found that if large-scale immigration continues at current rates, there will be 'new pressures' on the environment and on public infrastructure – especially in London and the South-East.<sup>4</sup>

So what can be made of all this? It is clear that the economic statistics can point to both negative and positive aspects of migration. But national policy needs to go beyond the economic figures and look at the larger picture. Yet again, policy-makers must ask themselves what impact this policy will have on the fabric of society in the long term. Of course, economic indices have a role to play – but they should be consultative rather than decisive. They should work to shape immigration policy rather than drive it.

In other words, it is sensible to mould immigration policy on principles of industry-specific supply and demand. For instance, in areas like healthcare or manufacturing that are heavily dependent on foreign workers, it is reasonable to aid any shortage with foreign workers. However, it would not be sensible to develop a 'skills-based' immigration policy without asking the question of why there is a skills shortage in the first place – and what could be done to resolve it.

But most importantly, any form of immigration policy must abide by the two principles mentioned previously. The first is to protect and preserve the fabric of society for the long term; that is, new migrants should be selected based on the likelihood of their successful integration and adherence to British values and culture. The second is to ensure that the decision-making power on immigration remains within the hands of the national government.

## THE BIBLICAL CASE FOR THE NATION STATE IS COMPELLING

This framework also extends to non-economic migrants, such as refugees or asylum seekers. The example set in the parable of the Good Samaritan is a clear instance of showing unrestricted love and compassion towards others, particularly those in need. Disasters such as the refugee crisis in Europe demand a response of love and compassion for those in the most vulnerable of situations. As a signatory country to the UN Refugee Convention, the UK formally pledged to host and care for those fleeing persecution. In 2015, for instance, it received 8,080 refugee applications, 40% (or 3,240) of which were accepted.<sup>5</sup>

Yet it has to remain a calculated response, one that achieves its goals and is sustainable in the long term, both for the host country and for the refugees themselves. Christian teaching may not serve as a guide for public policy (indeed, it was probably never intended to), but it does serve as a guide for personal transformation and spiritual growth.

However, an exegesis of the Tower of Babel in Genesis 11.1–9 may also point to a compelling biblical argument in favour of the nation state. The Lord stepped in to prevent selfish ambition achieving, most probably, humanity's self-destruction. How did he do so? By confusing languages and spreading the people over all the earth (Genesis 11.7). There is a biblical foundation for the independence and sovereignty of the nation state. Christianity does seem to paint a picture of nation states that have some level of cohesion within themselves but also interaction – be it conflict or cooperation – among themselves.

Immigration policy – whether influenced by social, economic or religious issues – must work towards preserving the fabric of society and maintaining the decision-making power of the nation state. Public policy needs to promote solidarity in the long term, not division.

David Goodhart has written extensively on this issue, and in a recent article for *The Guardian* he asked a particularly poignant question: 'When solidarity and diversity pull against each other, which side should public policy favour?'

He argues that ‘Lifestyle diversity and high immigration bring cultural and economic dynamism, but they can erode feelings of mutual obligation.’ The overarching responsibility and challenge of policy-makers is therefore to promote a common culture that can incorporate those of different backgrounds, yet at the same time maintain a level of common cohesion and solidarity.<sup>6</sup>

It may look like appeasing a Hobbesian line of thought, but ultimately national sovereignty and solidarity are nothing to be ashamed of, rather to be championed and protected. Christianity calls people to ‘love your neighbour as yourself’ (Mark 12.31). Christian teaching does not ask ‘Who is my neighbour?’ rather ‘To whom am I a neighbour?’ It forces an inward change of being that only then is followed by outward action – not the other way around. The focus therefore is as much on individual character and desires as on the action of showing love and compassion for others. Indeed, it is only by building the former that one can truly fulfil the latter.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Also referred to as ‘Wilsonian thought’.

<sup>2</sup> Peter Hitchens, ‘In Praise of Borders’, *First Things*, October issue (2017); [www.firstthings.com/article/2017/10/in-praise-of-borders](http://www.firstthings.com/article/2017/10/in-praise-of-borders).

<sup>3</sup> Peter Varghese, ‘The Nation State is Key to Peace and Prosperity’, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 19 November 2014; [www.smh.com.au/comment/the-nation-state-is-key-to-peace-and-prosperity-20141118-11pieq.html](http://www.smh.com.au/comment/the-nation-state-is-key-to-peace-and-prosperity-20141118-11pieq.html).

<sup>4</sup> Robert Rowthorn, *The Costs and Benefits of Large-Scale Immigration: Exploring the Economic and Demographic Consequences for the UK* (London: Civitas, 2015); [www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/largescaleimmigration.pdf](http://www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/largescaleimmigration.pdf), p. 70.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80.

<sup>6</sup> Goodhart David, ‘Discomfort of Strangers’, *The Guardian*, 24 February 2004; [www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/feb/24/immigrationandpublicservices.eu](http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/feb/24/immigrationandpublicservices.eu).

